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DISCRIMINATION: A CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
FRANK S. SENGSTOCK* AND MARY C. SENGSTOCK**
The last quarter of a century has seen our judicial system exercise a
bold and determined effort to strengthen the rights of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. That effort has produced a strange
dilemma for the courts. It is one kind of task to resolve a conflict
between a constitutional right and a force of oppression. But, the
courts are confronted with a different kind of challenge when the
conflict results from two distinct rights running on a path of collision.
The challenge is a dilemma. Upholding one right may necessarily
involve placing limits on the other. Which of two opposing rights
must prevail in a given controversy? The choice may be between
two principles of liberty to which men have equally aspired through-
out the ages.
The dilemma between conflicting rights exists today in many areas.
It exists with respect to the collision between the right of freedom
of the press and the right of a fair trial. The courts have to decide
where one right limits the other. The right of the individual not to
have the state establish a religion by support of its collateral activities
is often in a state of conflict with the right to exercise the precepts of
one's religion. This dilemma confronts our courts today.
The fourteenth amendment guarantees liberty and equality. These
twin rights constitute the basis of the right to discriminate and the
right to be free from discrimination, respectively. How should a con-
flict between the right to discriminate and the right to be free from
discrimination be resolved? It is to the subject of this question that we
address this article.
THE PROBLEM: THE JUSTICE OF DISCRIMINATION AND ITS ABUSE
Among the most widely discussed problems of our society are dis-
crimination and prejudice. Though related, these two ideas are not
synonymous. "Prejudice" is basically an attitude, a feeling, either fa-
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vorable or, in its most common usage today, unfavorable, towards
another person. "Discrimination," on the other hand, implies outward
activity; it is the external expression of one's internal attitude. Thus,
discrimination may also be either positive or negative. But like prejudice,
this term is usually confined to its negative usage; hence, discrimination
refers to the external expression of internal feelings of antipathy.1
It is discrimination, or the outward expression of hostility, which is
most deplored; prejudice becomes objectionable to society only in so
far as it serves as a motivation to discriminatory action. Thus, if a man
thinks ill of another, but does nothing to harm him, society has no
cause to be alarmed.
Indeed society has no right to interfere with or engineer the prejudices
of men. Such arrogance on the part of society is the death of freedom
of thought and expression as guaranteed under the first amendment.
But when man tries to express his hostility, or considers doing so,
society has cause and the right to become concerned.
Despite the conceptual difference between prejudice and discrimina-
tion, the two are often discussed and analyzed together, as it is recog-
nized that a negative feeling frequently does serve as the basis for
discriminatory action. Hence, in the present discussion of discrimination,
we shall find it useful to consider the literature on both topics, as the
material on prejudice indirectly assists in an understanding of discrimi-
nation.
In the recent proliferation of literature on the subject of prejudices
and discrimination, social scientists have concerned themselves with try-
ing to explain why people develop feelings of antipathy, or prejudice,
toward other persons, and why they choose to single out some persons
for unequal or discriminatory treatment in their daily activities. Legal
analysts and humanitarians alike have joined the social scientists in an
attempt to find a means of preventing prejudicial attitudes and dis-
criminatory activities. In the process of attempting to prevent such ac-
tivities, however, the alternative side of the problem-the degree to
which the individual may select his associates, a process of discrimina-
tion by its very nature-has been largely ignored. So appalled are they
by the type of racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination which has
become synonymous with the term "discrimination," that most seri-
ous scholars have failed to consider the fact that discrimination is a
process which all of us, even those who are frequently most hurt by the
discrimination of others, feel impelled to practice. The fact is, however,
I. ALuxORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDIcE, 67, 14-15, (3rd ed. 1955).
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that we are practicing discrimination daily: when we entertain the next-
door neighbor in our homes, but nor the man across the street; when
we hire the college graduate for the newly initiated position in the com-
pany and turn away the experienced performer without an academic de-
gree; when we grant a loan to the well-heeled businessman and turn down
the indigent applicant. Thus, the society which seeks to provide freedom
from discrimination for its members is faced with a dilemma: Can, or
should it eliminate all discrimination from within its bounds? Or are
there only certain types of discrimination which are undesirable?
In our zeal to shield minority groups from the ignominy of being
barred from associating on an equal basis with other members of so-
ciety, we move dangerously close to dictating the totality of associations
of every individual in society. As we decree that a man cannot refuse
to work with, or eat with, or recreate with, or study with persons of
a different race, creed, or color, we simultaneously dictate with whom
he shall work or eat or study or play. We have, in effect, deprived him
of the privilege of free association with persons of his own choice. Do
we, as a society, wish to pursue the policy of depriving individuals of
the privilege of free association? Or do we wish only to limit this
privilege?
Some social analysts have indirectly suggested that a degree of social
discrimination is actually necessary for the effective functioning of a
democratic form of government. For the right to choose one's associates,
that is, the right to discriminate in determining one's social relationships,
is a basic element in the establishment of the voluntary associations so
essential to the free society.
As early as 1834, Alexis de Tocqueville analyzed the factors which
endbled a nation to live under a democratic government, free from
oppression by a minority, and, on the other hand, from the oppression
of the minorities of the nation by an all-powerful majority. If freedom
is to be preserved, he believed, it is necessary that the members of the
society have the right of association: the right to meet with others who
share similar opinions and to establish complex associations through
which their voices may be heard in the society.2
In aristocratic nations the body of the nobles and the wealthy are
in themselves natural associations which check the abuses of
power. In countries where such associations do not exist, if private
individuals cannot create an artificial and temporary substitute for
2. 1 DETocQUEVIL.E, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 192-94 (9th ed. 1963).
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them I can see no permanent protection against the most galling
tyranny; and a great people may be oppressed with impunity by a
small faction or by a single individual. 3
Sustained by associations, ". . the opponent of oppression [is] never
alone ... ." Lacking them, each individual is alone and unprotected.
What strength can even public opinion have retained when no
twenty persons are connected by a common tie, when not a man,
nor a family, nor a chartered corporation, nor class, nor free in-
stitution, has the power of representing or exerting that opinion,
and when every citizen, being equally weak, equally poor, and
equally isolated, has only his personal impotence to oppose to the
organized force of the government? "
Thus, Tocqueville concludes that the right of association is essential to
the effective functioning of a democratic society.
A more recent theorist, C. Wright Mills, has distinguished two types
of society, the "public" and the "mass." In the former there is a free
interchange of ideas and opinions leading to effective action; and such
interchange is not under the authority of the government. In a "mass
society," on the other hand, there is little interchange of ideas, and the
authorities of the society direct the opinions which are expressed,
largely through the use of the major communication media.' Mills sees
in American society an alarming trend away from the public and
toward the mass society. He comments: ". . . we realize we have moved
a considerable distance along the road to the mass society. At the end
of that road there is totalitarianism. . . ." What, in Mills' opinion, are
the factors moving us along that road away from the free democratic
society? "One of the most important of the structural transformations
involved is the decline of the voluntary association as a genuine in-
strument of the public" s [italics supplied].
Villiam Kornhauser also notes that a technique of the agents of
oppression is to eliminate such voluntary associations: "Totalitarian elites
destroy independent groups .... [They] seek to keep the population
in an atomized state...
3. Id. at 195.
4. Id. at 328.
5. Id.
6. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE, 303-04 (4th cd. 1957).
7. Id. at 304.
8. Id. at 306.
9. KORNHAUSER, THE POLITICS OF MASS SOCIETY, 128 (6th ed. 1966).
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Thus, political theorists tend to agree that the existence of voluntary
associations, which implies a right of association on the part of the mem-
bers of the society, is essential to the existence of a free, democratic
society. This type of society is sometimes referred to as a "pluralist
society," io or as social or cultural pluralism.
Traditionally, American constitutional jurisprudence has sanctioned
the right of association within the protection of freedom embodied in
the first amendment and made applicable to the states under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the Supreme Court
in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama held:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association, as this Court has more than once recognized by re-
marking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and
assembly.... It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in as-
sociation for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech .... 11
The Court noted that beliefs advanced through an association could
be political, economic, religious or even cultural. In Griswold v. Con-
necticut,12 the emphasis was placed on the notion that association is a
form of expression of opinion. Its existence is necessary in making the
express guarantees of the first amendment meaningful.
Clearly then, a democratic society is faced with a dilemma. On the
one hand, its leaders wish to make the privileges of that society avail-
able to all. This goal cannot be achieved when some members of the
society are prevented from attaining these privileges through the dis-
criminatory action of more powerful members. At the same time, how-
ever, a democratic society depends upon the free and voluntary par-
ticipation of the members of society in private associations.
Unfortunately, most "liberal" theorists, while they have tended to
favor both social pluralism and non-discrimination, have failed to recog-
nize the apparent inconsistency in the two positions.
Faced with the concrete reality of an overt discriminatory act in
employment or housing, they ["liberals," -well-meaning people,
10. Id. at 40.
11. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
12. 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
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and professional intergroup relations workers] are concertedly
against it. But the question of whether Negroes, or Jews, or Cath-
olics, or Mexican-Americans should maintain or lose their group
identity in the America of the future is one which, for the most
part, receives no thoughtful attention or is dealt with largely in
cliches. 13
It is, however, imperative that such a clarification be achieved if society
and the judicial processes reflecting its mores are to grant, at the same
time, the right of the individual to be free from discrimination and his
right to discriminate when he so chooses. When and under what cir-
cumstances is the practice of discrimination an unjust and impermissible
thing? When, on the other hand, is it not only just and permissible
to discriminate, but a dangerous infringement of the individual's right
of association to prohibit him from doing so? The inconsistency be-
tween pluralism and non-discrimination clearly shows up when one
reflects upon the fourteenth amendment.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, rati-
fied in 1868 in the Civil War aftermath, provided: ". . . nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 14 Liberty and equal protection of the laws, the
twin pillars of the Declaration of Independence, thus achieved the sanc-
tion of constitutional law.
We have already mentioned that inherent in the concept of liberty
is the right to discriminate not only in the activities we seek to pursue
but also in the persons with whom we choose to associate. We pointed
out that the right of association is essentially the right to discriminate.
The people cannot be deprived of the right to discriminate in the se-
lection of their associates without sacrificing an essential ingredient of
their liberty. A deprival of the right to discriminate amounts to a denial
of substantive due process. Nevertheless, reasonable legislative enact-
ments in behalf of the general welfare should not be regarded as a de-
prival of due process; for the right to liberty mentioned in the Con-
stitution is intrinsically limited and qualified by the legitimate exercise of
the police powers of the state. This limitation has been universally ac-
cepted by all the courts of this land.
13. Gonox, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE, 8 (5th ed. 1966).
14. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The notion of equal protection of the laws signifies equality of all
men before the law. It is a specific negation of discrimination. It qualifies
the right to discriminate by assuring to all men the right to participate
equally with each other in all of the benefits of life created or pro-
tected by law. It confers upon man the right to be free from discrimi-
nation in the enjoyment of these benefits. Man's effort at the pursuit of
happiness could be altogether frustrated without the presence of this
guarantee.
Thus, the fourteenth amendment in consecutive clauses is the guar-
antor of liberty and equality. The paradox of these two rights was
recently observed in a decision of the United States Supreme Court
wherein it was noted:
There are two complementary principles to be reconciled in this
case. One is the right of the individual to pick his own associates
so as to express his preferences and dislikes, and to fashion his
private life by joining such clubs and groups as he chooses. The
other is the constitutional ban in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment against state-sponsored racial in-
equality, which of course bars a city from acting as trustee under
a private will that serves the racial segregation cause.15
The paradox posed by the simultaneous existence of these two rights
was never fully appreciated by the architects of the amendment. It re-
flects in a legal context the broader problem of society in developing a
workable relationship that will give reality to the right of discrimina-
tion and to the right of freedom from it.
We propose to undertake a study of the problems in its legal context
by exploring the history of the attempts of American society since the
Reconstruction to reconcile these two apparently inconsistent rights.
Contemporary approaches to the problem will be analyzed and evalu-
ated. We will undertake the task of forecasting the future course that
reconciliation may take. We propose a new approach based on consid-
eration of what social scientists deem to be justified discrimination and
what they regard as discrimination invidious in character. Emphasis
throughout this article will be placed on the extent to which the exer-
cise of the right to discriminate by private individuals and groups
against other persons is qualified by the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
15. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298 (1966).
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THE BIRTH OF A NEW RIGHT
The appropriate place to commence any research regarding the ex-
tent to which the equal protection clause inhibits the exercise of the
right to discriminate is by studying the evidence of the framers' original
understanding of that section. We proceed mindful of the caveat in
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell:
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time
of its adoption it means today, it is intended to say that the great
clauses of the Constitution which the framers, with the conditions
and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the
statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a
narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memo-
rable warning-"we must never forget that it is a constitution we
are expounding" 16...
Congressional debates over the proposing of the fourteenth amend-
ment centered around amnesty provisions. Little beyond broad general-
izations can be found in the record of congressional proceedings. The
most revealing comment on the equal protection clause was made by
Senator Jacob Howard, the Michigan radical, who had opened debate
on the adoption of the amendment in the Senate.
This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with
the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not ap-
plicable to another. It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a
crime for which the white man is not to be hanged. It protects the
black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same
shield which it throws over the white man .... 17
A few Democrats spoke against the broad language of the clause. Un-
fortunately, the campaign of 1866 is equally useless as a means of in-
forming contemporary society what intent the ratifiers had in mind
when adopting this provision. We have reached the conclusion from
a study of the recorded debates that they offer no assistance in the search
for some criterion by which the conflicting demands of liberty and
equal protection of the laws can be discovered. It is not at all surprising
that Chief Justice Warren remarked in Brown v. Board of Education:
16. 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
17. CONG. GLOBE, 39 Cong. 1st Sess., 2765 (1866).
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The most avid proponents of the post-War amendments un-
doubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all
persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their op-
ponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and
the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most
limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures
had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.18
In searching for the framers' intent in adopting the equal protection
clause, resort is made by contemporary scholarship to an examination
of the philosophical milieu of the congressional leaders of the Recon-
struction Era.'9 The first section of the fourteenth amendment pro-
vided in toto: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." 20 The amendment was sponsored
by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction which accepted the draft
of the above-quoted section from a text supplied by Representative
John Bingham of Ohio. That text was a distillation of two other legis-
lative proposals: the "Bingham Amendment" of 186521 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.22 The first bill empowered Congress "to secure
all persons in every state within this Union equal protection in their
rights of life, liberty and property." 23 The other source declared
that ". . . citizens of every race and color .. . shall have the same
right.., to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings .. ," 24
Bingham combined the terminology of the two proposals and offered
to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction the present text of the
18. 347 U.S. 483,489 (1954).
19. In general see: FLAcK, THE ADOPTON OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDmrNT (1908);
JAMES, Tim FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT (1939); TENBROEK, THE An-
SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, 221-22 (1951); Graham, Our "Declara-
tory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1954); Bickel, The Original Under-
standing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAnv. L. REV. 1 (1955); Frank & Munro,
The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUm. L. REV. 131
(1950).
20. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. For an excellent account of the legislative vicissitudes of the Bingham amend-
ment see Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 29-40 (1955).
22. 14 STAT. 27 (1866).
23. Bickel, supra note 21 at 30.
24. 14 STAT. 27 § 1 (1866).
19671
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW RkVIiE\V
amendment. Specific rights were not mentioned so that sufficient
elasticity to permit the clause to be co-extensive with the broadest
claims of Negro rights that were urged by the extremists in the Radical
camp in the 1866 Congress would be realized.25 This latitudinarian tactic
of course created a built-in ambiguity that would afford the judiciary
utmost freedom in construing its meaning. The tactic nicely satisfied
the supporters of the amendment, whose personal views contradicted
each other. Bingham, no doubt, was influenced by the French slogan
Egalit6 devant la loi, employed by Senator Sumner in 1849 in oral argu-
ment before the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Roberts v. BostonZ.2-
The court was called upon to consider the significance of a provision in
the Massachusetts Constitution that stated that: "all men are bora free
and equal." 27 To Sumner the phrase meant "equality before the law." 28
While Sumner did not prevail in court, he did succeed in giving the
abolitionists a new battle cry. Thereafter "equality before the law"
and "equal rights" were used synonymously.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was designed to eliminate the in-
equalities of the Black Codes in criminal and commercial law and this
goal undoubtedly was absorbed by the equal protection clause. In
fact, the equal protection clause was regarded as a measure curative of
an inadequate constitutional foundation for the Civil Rights Act.29 In
detail the Act spoke in these terms:
... Citizens, of every race and color shall have the same right.., to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
persons, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penal-
ties .... 30
In introducing the Civil Rights Act, Senator Trumbull asserted that the
great fundamental rights of mankind were particularized in the legisla-
25. Radical Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan proposed that the amendment should
have read: "in respect to all civil rights, there is to be hereafter no distinctions between
white race and black race." CONG. GLOBE supra note 17 at 504.
26. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
27. MAss. CoNsT. part 1, art. I.
28. Supra note 26 at 201.
29. 2 MORISON & COMIMAGER, THE GROXWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 39-40 (5th ed.
1962).
30. 14 STAT. 27 § 1 (1866).
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don: the right to acquire property, the right to go and come at pleasure,
the right to make contracts. These rights make up the very principles
by which men are free. The act was operative against individual op-
pression of these rights.31 This was equally true of the Bingham Amend-
ment. Senator Bingham, who later authored the fourteenth amend-
ment, commented on the quoted provision of this Act:
Now what does this bill propose? To reform the whole civil and
criminal code of every State government by declaring that there
shall be no discrimination between citizens on account of race or
color in civil rights or in the penalties prescribed by their laws. I
humbly bow before the majesty of justice as I bow before the
majesty of that God whose attribute it is, and therefore declare
there should be no such inequality or discrimination even in the
penalties of crime. .... 32
The Civil Rights Act and the Bingham Amendment reflected the mood
of the Congress which adopted the fourteenth amendment. The prin-
cipals involved in the fourteenth amendment were the same sponsors of
these previous proposals. It is seriously contended by scholars that these
several pieces of legislation enable us to understand "the reconstruction
decade of the equal protection clause." I In the light of this under-
standing, one scholar has concluded that the equal protection clause
created a host of specific rights in contradistinction to the tenet that it
was a mere prohibition by constitutional fiat of state action character-
istically discriminatory in regard to any group or class.
The equal protection clause was, with the foregoing qualification,
originally understood to mean the following: all men, without re-
gard to race or color, should have the same rights to acquire real
and personal property and to enter into business enterprises; crimi-
nal and civil law, in procedures or penalties, should make no dis-
tinctions whatsoever because of race or color; there should be
no segregation of individuals on the basis of race or color as to
the right to own or use land; there should be no segregation of
individuals on the basis of race or color in the use of utilities, such
as transportation or hotels; with reservations, for here there is
substantial divergence, there should be no segregation in the
31. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 17 at 474-76.
32. Id. at 1290.
33. Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws,"
50 COLUM. L. REv. 131, 167 (1950).
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schools.... On the other hand, the clause was meant to have no
bearing on the right to vote; the evidence of its contemplated
effect on state anti-miscegenation laws is unclear; and it was gen-
erally understood to have no bearing on segregation of a purely
private sort in situations fairly independent of the law as in
churches, cemeteries, or private clubs.34
That the fourteenth amendment, as intended by its framers, created
specific rights is denied by no reputable scholar today. The conflict
of opinion revolves around whether or not historical evidence war-
rants the conclusion that the purpose of the amendment was merely
to constitutionalize Trumbull's fundamental rights philosophy or
whether it was an affirmation of the extremists' point of view-Bing-
ham's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866."5
It is doubtful that the amendment would have emerged out of Con-
gress if it had been understood as constitutionalizing Bingham's posi-
tion.
The Republican Radicals no doubt favored the broadest possible
construction of the fourteenth amendment. But to accept their
view is to ignore the dynamics of the legislative process. A piece
of controversial legislation, in an area in which some legislators,
perhaps most legislators making up the majority want to go a long
way, and others in the majority want to limit the legislation to a
minimal step, must be construed in accordance with the intent of
those who want to do the least and whose votes are still necessary
to pass the legislation30
The moderate position left open for future determination the query
of how do you distinguish between rights which are essentially funda-
mental and those which are not? Tradition, history, and cultural evolu-
tion are the principal factors to be used in a quest for an answer. In
accepting the interpretation that the equal protection clause has as its
basic idea the notion of the protection of the fundamental rights of
man, we remain confronted with the further problem of understand-
34. Id. at 167-68.
35. See, Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957) vis-h-vis Avins, The Civil Rights Act of
1875: Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment and Public Accommodations,
66 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1966).
36. Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875 and the Civil Rights Cases Revisited: State
Action, The Fourteenth Amendment, and Housing, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 5, 20 (1966).
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ing the extent to which the equal protection clause qualifies the right
to discriminate. But of one thing we are certain: that the right to dis-
criminate was intended to be limited by the fundamental rights of other
men.
Historians regard legislation passed shortly after the ratification of
the amendment as providing evidence that the framers understood the
equal protection clause as authorizing protection of the rights con-
ferred against invasion by private individuals and groups as well as by
official state action.
It is clear beyond reasonable doubt that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was meant to enable Congress to legislate affirmatively in
behalf of a racial group which a state might, because it was a racial
group, choose not to protect from the action of private persons.37
Two federal statutes are of primary relevance in fortifying the theory
that the fourteenth amendment afforded a constitutional basis for
federal suppression of individual acts of discrimination where state
action was not present: the Ku Klux Klan Act of 187 138 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1875.a9 Both pieces of legislation were passed by con-
gresses, the memberships of which consisted of many veteran legislators
whose services dated back to 1866. These acts included the following
provisions
That in all cases where ... , domestic violence . . . in any State
shall so obstruct the execution of the laws thereof, and of the
United States, as to deprive any portion or class of the people of
such a State of any of the rights, privileges, or immunities, or
protection, named in the Constitution ... and the... State shall
... fail in or refuse protection of the people in such rights, such
facts shall be deemed a denial by such State of the equal protec-
tion of the laws ... 40
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances
on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement;
subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law,
37. Frank & Munro, supra note 33 at 163.
38. 17 STAT. 13 (1871).
39. 18 STAT. 335 (1875).
40. 17 STAT. 14 S 3 (1871).
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and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color regardless
of any previous condition of servitude.41
The terms of the legislation speak for themselves: state action, as a pre-
requisite for applying the fourteenth amendment, was disregarded by
a majority of the respective members of the congresses in 1871 and
1875. "The best answer to the question whether contemporaries of the
Fourteenth Amendment thought it permitted legislation against lynch-
ing is that they passed just such legislation." 42
THE BIRTH OF STATE ACTION
No sooner had the amendment been ratified than the Supreme Court
began erecting an iron curtain around the private sector of human
activity from encroachments effectuated through constitutional re-
straint. In 1875, the United States Supreme Court opined in United
States v. Cruishank:
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but
this provision does not... add anything to the rights which one
citizen has under the Constitution against another.43
In 1879 the Court announced in Virginia v. Reeves: "The provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution we have quoted all
have reference to State action exclusively, not to any action of private
individuals." 44 But the classic delimitation of the fourteenth amend-
ment came in an opinion, penned by Associate Justice Joseph P. Bradley
in 1883; and it has stood since then, like the Rock of Gibraltar, so that
even today no member of the present Supreme Court has questioned
its fundamental soundness. The opinion was drafted in support of de-
cisions in what has become known as the Civil Rights Cases.45
Those decisions settled five cases in which the same federal question
was raised: was the Civil Rights Act of 1875 constitutional? Two of
the cases tested the right of Congress to enact public accommodation
legislation; two tested the right of Congress to pass legislation barring
discrimination by a privately owned theatre; and the final controversy
41. 18 STAT. 335 § 1 (1875).
42. Frank & Munro, supra note 33 at 165.
43. 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875).
44. 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
45. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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centered on the immunity of railroads to maintain segregated opera-
dions regardless of proscriptions in the act. The Court ruled against
the constitutionality of the act, reasoning that congress exceeded its
powers under the amendment when it regulated privately owned busi-
ness operations. For the Court, the key words in the amendment were
"'No State... ." Thus the Court ruled:
It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Indi-
vidual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the
amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and
makes void all State legislation, and State action of every kind
which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property
without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the
equal protection of the laws.... Positive rights and privileges are
undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are
secured by way of prohibition against State laws and State pro-
ceedings affecting those rights and privileges and by power given
to Congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibi-
tion into effect: and such legislation must necessarily be predicated
upon such supposed State laws or State proceedings, and be di-
rected to the correction of their operation and effect.46
Bradley assumed arguendo that public accommodation features as well
as the conveyance and amusement aspects of legislation were essential
rights of the citizen which no state can abridge or interfere with. The
legislation was invalidated solely on the ground that the requisite state
action was absent. Without this restriction, Bradley reasoned that the
entire federal character of the government would cease.
Such legislation [enacted by congress] cannot properly cover the
whole domain of rights appertaining to life, liberty, and property,
defining them and providing for their vindication. That would be
to establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights
between man and man in society. It would be to make Congress
take the place of the State legislatures and to supersede them. 7
Thus, the character of the federal system warranted the conclusion that
the equal protection clause guaranteed rights but those rights were to
be free from discrimination by the state. Acts of private discrimination
46. Id. at 11.
47. Id. at 13.
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were left to the regulation of the state through the exercise of its police
powers. Failure to act by the state to correct private abuse of the
right to discriminate was to remain remediless. The Court's concluding
note was:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of benef-
icent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of
that state, there must be some stages in the progress of his eleva-
tion when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the
special favorite of the laws, and when his rights, as a citizen or a
man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other
men's rights are protected.48
To Bradley, liberty and equal protection of the laws were reconciled.
Equal protection was not a restriction on liberty but on state action, and
relief from discriminatory acts was assumed by the Constitution only
when state action was present. In evaluating the opinion, one scholar
has commented:
Taken without limitations, and without consideration of the back-
ground of the amendment, this logic of the majority opinion
would appear unanswerable. 49  Almost all of those traditional
American liberties which we espouse are liberties protected against
the action of the government, state or federal, and not against the
action of the individual.5°
While the logic may appear unanswerable, Justice John M. Harlan
saw in it an Achilles heel. To Harlan, the activities regulated in the
Civil Rights Cases were governmental in character and therefore subject
to the equal protection clause even on the premise that the fourteenth
amendment was corrective of only state action.
In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of
the Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns,
and managers of places of public amusement are agents or instru-
mentalities of the State, because they are charged with duties to
the public, and are amenable, in respect of their duties and func-
tions, to governmental regulation.... [A] denial, by these instru-
mentalities of the State, to the citizen, because of his race, of that
48. Id. at 25.
49. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 T.x. L. RE V. 347, 348 (1963).
50. Id. at 51.
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equality of civil rights secured to him by law, is a denial by the
State, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.rl
Harlan recognized that purely social relations were beyond the scope
of the fourteenth amendment; but businesses serving the public benefit
or convenience should be recognized as extensions of the state. Equal
protection of the laws was not something variable depending on the
character of the economic system-capitalistic vis-d-vis socialist. A
glimpse of how far Harlan extended this principle can be derived from
his position that places of public amusement which were privately owned
fitted into the extension of state action conceived broadly. "It is that lat-
ter portion of Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion which lives on and has
gradually become more and more vital with the passing of the years." 52
It affords today a method of paying lip service to the stare decisis of
Bradley's decision and yet making substantial incursions against the
right to discriminate on the basis of equal protection of the laws.
Alternatively, Harlan argued that the colored race was vested with
national and state citizenship pursuant to the fourteenth amendment.
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. . . .. The
Associate Justice argued:
But what was secured to colored citizens of the United States-as
between them and their respective States-by the national grant to
them of State citizenship? With what rights, privileges, or im-
munities did this grant invest them? There is one, if there be no
other: exemption from race discrimination in respect of any civil
right belonging to citizens of the white race in the same State....
Citizenship in this country necessarily imports at least equality of
civil rights among citizens of every race in the same State.54
Civil rights of the people were left to the states to be regulated with
the qualification that national legislation could be passed to insure that
state-defined civil rights-the right of a private carrier to provide public
transportation; the right of an innkeeper to provide public accommo-
dations-were free from discrimination based on race or color. The
right to engage in these business activities was subject to regulation by
51. Civil Rights Cases, supra note 45 at 58-59.
52. Williams, supra note 49 at 350.
53. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, S 1.
54. Civil Rights Cases, supra note 45 at 48.
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the police powers of the state. The fourteenth amendment subjected the
exercise of the police powers to national control to effectuate the
right of freedom from discrimination in the civil rights of citizens to
accept these services.
To posterity, the most important legacy of the Civil Rights Cases
is that it isolated the right of freedom from discrimination to the orbit
of state action. It left to the future the determination of how does a
state act. How a state acts is the basis for deciding any conflict between
the right to discriminate and the right to be free from discrimination
until such time as state action ceases to be a. premise for the operation
of the fourteenth amendment.
THE DEMISE AND RESURRECTION OF A RIGHT
The Descent Into Obscurity
The balance of power was struck in favor of the right to discriminate
over the right to be free from discrimination with the decision of the
Civil Rights Cases. Conditioning the right to be free from discrimination
by requiring the presence of state action effectively nullified that guaran-
tee of equality in a society committed to the laissez-faire theory that the
government which governs the least governs the best. Three years later,
1896, the Court pronounced the final rites over the right to be free
from discrimination as that right was constitutionalized by the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. It was held in Plessy
v. Ferguson"5 that the equal protection clause meant the right to "sep-
arate but equal" treatment. If Negroes and whites were accorded like
treatment, the Court could not perceive how anyone was being dis-
criminated against if he was separated against his will from those who
were racially different. Classifications of people were valid even if such
separations were designed to achieve the goal presently known as
apartheid as long as the treatment was otherwise equal.
The doctrine of separate but equal treatment remained the law of the
land from 1893 to 1954. It constituted the backbone of segregation
from 1893 onward. During this period in the history of the United
States, the equal protection clause would have continued in a relatively
lifeless role as the shield against private discrimination, even if the con-
cept of state action had measurably expanded or if the requirement
thereof was overruled. The state as well as the private person could segre-
55. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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gate as long as it dealt with the various classifications of persons equally.
The inherent logical possibility of achieving simultaneously both qualities
in actions undertaken never appeared to be questioned during the period.
Thus, an annotation in the Lawyers' Edition of the United States Supreme
Court Reports declared in 1949: "Indeed, it may be said that the Constitu-
tionality of present-day segregation provisions is directly dependent upon
the Plessy doctrine." " The demise of the equal protection clause as a
means of eliminating ethnic discrimination was so effective from 1893
to 1954 that the provision became a forgotten relative of the Constitu-
tion. The great shield against the acts of discrimination seldom pro-
tected anyone as a practical matter. Minority groups found that the
Court could be persuaded to protect their rights and interests when
such rights and interests were fortified by claims that the due process
clause was being violated. Few significant decisions sustaining the right
to be free from discrimination unqualified by the separate but equal
doctrine are reported during that sixty-year span. Because of its his-
torical importance we undertake an analysis of the decision of Plessy
v. Ferguson-
Louisiana had passed a statute in 1890 which required "equal but
separate accommodations" for white and Negro railway passengers.s
Pursuant to the statute, a railway operating intrastate within Louisiana
maintained separate white and Negro passenger coaches. Plessy, a Negro,
refused to sit in a coach designated for Negroes and instead sat in a coach
designated for whites by the railway, a privately owned and operated
corporation. The legislation passed, empowered and required the rail-
ways to designate which coaches were to be exclusively white and which
exclusively Negro. Plessy was convicted for violating the statute. He
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition on the theory
that the statute was violative of the equal protection clause.
The Court sustained his conviction. In an opinion by Justice Brown,
the Court declared that the equal protection clause insured the politi-
cal and civil equality of all minorities but not the social equality.5 Segre-
gation affects social equality not political equality. A law fostering segre-
gation 'was held to be a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
What the state could not do is to accord political and civil rights to one
56. 94 L. Ed. 1121, 1123 (1949).
57. Plessy, supra note 55.
58. La. Acts 1890, No. III at 152 (1890).
59. Plessy, supra note 55 at 544.
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class of people and not to another. Classification by color was proper
as long as equal political and civil rights were upheld in each class.
The legislation of Louisiana-"separate but equal accommodations"-
was ruled to be a reasonable exercise of its police powers. Separation
of the races was evaluated in regard to its reasonableness by the estab-
lished mores and traditions of people, with the objective of public order
and general welfare as goals. The equal protection clause was an elastic
right stretching and contracting with attitudes that were contemporary
to any particular time. The state could segregate ethnic groups as long
as political and civil equality were preserved. Nothing in the opinion
indicated that private institutions had to provide equal or duplicating
facilities 'when the state commanded segregation. The Court summarized
its position thusly:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely be-
cause the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. ....
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish
distinctions based upon physical differences and the attempt to do
so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present
situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal one
cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be
inferior to the other socially the Constitution of the United States
cannot put them upon the same plane.00
To the Court's opinion, Harlan dissented. Equal protection of the
laws did more than sanction slavery, provided it was equally imposed
upon the white and Negro races. The arbitrary separation of citizens
is a badge of servitude, inconsistent with equality before the law.
Equal protection was the protection of liberty equally shared by all
citizens. The fundamental objection to the Louisiana legislation was that
it constituted an interference vitb personal liberty.6' Social equality is an
irrelevant straw man. It does not exist in a jury box where segregation
would be clearly violative of civil rights. Harlan looked beyond the
letter of the legislation to its purpose. It was clear that the purpose of
the Louisiana statute was to degrade the Negro under a thin disguise of
equal accommodations. The purpose invalidated the legislation. Enjoy-
60. Id. at 551-52.
61. Id. at 555, 557, 563.
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ment of all public rights was mutually assured to all races by the equal
protection clause.
The doctrine of separate but equal treatment was judicially applied to
a wide variety of situations during the years following the Plessy de-
cision.
The types of relations which have been the subject of race sep-
aration law vary from the fleeting contacts of fellow passengers on
common carriers or of patrons of places of public recreation and
amusement to the more enduring contacts of fellow students at
educational institutions and the more intimate relationship of mar-
riage partners.0
Plessy concerned intrastate travel. Did the separate but equal doctrine
apply to interstate commerce? Could a carrier segregate by its own
regulations, unprotected by the dictates of state statutes? The Court
responded to these queries affirmatively in Chiles v. Chesapeake &
0. R. Co.6
Chiles, a Negro, purchased a first class train ticket from Washington,
D.C. to Lexington, Kentucky. At Ashland, Kentucky, he had to with-
draw from a car reserved for white passengers and seat himself in a
coach designated for Negroes. Chiles instituted an action alleging viola-
tion of his rights as an interstate passenger. The segregation imple-
mented company policy and was not prescribed by state law. Indeed,
it could not have been dictated by state statutes since such legislation
would have constituted a burden on interstate commerce. 4 The com-
pany policy was instituted because economics dictated that the segre-
gation policy required by the statute of intrastate travel be carried
over to interstate transit.
The Court declared that a cause of action did not exist. Absent fed-
eral legislation, Congress intended that the carrier provide its own rules
regarding segregation. The rules had to be reasonable and the test of
reasonableness was "the general sentiment of the community for whom
62. Ransmeier, The Fourteenth Amendment and the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine,
50 MicH. L. REv. 203 (1951); for a historical treatment of the doctrine, see Note, Racial
Segregation and the Separate But Equal Doctrine, 26 Norm DAiE L. REv. 81 (1950);
Note, The Fall of an Unconstitutional Fiction-The "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 30
NEB. L. REv. 69 (1950).
63. 218 U.S. 71 (1910).
64. See, Hall v. De Cuir 95 U.S. 485 (1877), where the court struck down a state
statute proscribing segregation on an interstate carrier as being violative of the com-
merce clause.
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they are made and upon whom they operate." >5 In support of this test
the Court looked to Plessy.6  Kentucky sentiment favored segregation;
hence, its reasonableness. The carrier's power was further qualified by
the rule that separation was permissible only when accompanied by
equality in treatment. Thus the separate but equal doctrine was im-
ported into an area of the law where state action was not present.
Plessy was being used as justification for privately imposed segregation
in interstate commerce as against a charge of subjecting such commerce
to an undue burden.
A significant fact overlooked by the Court was that Chiles, a pur-
chaser of a first class ticket, had to shift to a coach, a second class ac-
commodation. This kind of circumstance attended the application of
the doctrine from the time of Plessy to 1954-minorities that were seg-
regated did not in fact enjoy equal accommodations-and much of the
litigation in the first half of the twentieth century focused on the factual
question of whether or not the accommodations were equal. Illustrative
of this latter type of litigation was McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co.67 in which Court struck as unconstitutional portions of an Oklahoma
segregation coach law6 8 that authorized carriers to provide sleeping and
dining cars exclusively for whites while making no similar accommoda-
tions for Negroes. Discrimination in this instance violated the equal
protection clause.0
The separate but equal doctrine was applied to the field of education
without its applicability ever having been litigated. The first United
States Supreme Court decision to apply the rule was Cumming v. Rich-
mond County Board of Education70 in which the separate school sys-
tem was assumed to be constitutional and furthermore inequality in
educational opportunities was approved as consistent with the equal
protection clause. The real irony of the decision was that its author
was Justice Harlan.
That assumption became a rule of law in 1927 when Chief Justice
Taft declared in dictum in a case testing the equality portion of the
doctrine: "Were this a new question it would call for very full argu-
ment and consideration, but we think it is the same question which has
65. Chiles, supra note 63 at 77.
66. Id. at 77.
67. 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
68. REv. LAws OKLA. §§ 860 et seq. (1910).
69. Cf. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941); Henderson v. United States,
339 U.S. 816 (1950).
70. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
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been many times decided to be within the constitutional power of the
state legislature to settle without intervention of the federal courts." "
The battleground thereafter shifted to litigation over the equality
provision of the separate but equal protection of the laws concept.
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,72 decided in 1938, held that the ex-
clusion of Negroes from a state-supported law school was a violation of
the equal protection clause where it failed to maintain a law school for
Negroes but instead provided payment of tuition at the university of
an adjacent state. Thereafter the Court pursued a tough line approach
toward unequal conditions in educational facilities. Economics and
practicality were not regarded as justifications for failing to provide
identical facilities for Negroes."
Discrimination in housing is the result of private interests attempting
to foster homogeneous neighborhoods for economic reasons. This at-
tempt has been manifested in a variety of forms ranging from restric-
tive covenants through racial zoning by cities to less formal arrangements.
Plessy would appear to be a natural tool to implement the right to dis-
criminate in the selling of homes in order to retain the homogeneous char-
acter of neighborhoods. However, the historical fact that the equal
protection clause was intended to validate the Civil Rights Act of 1866
complicated the application of Plessy. It should be recalled that the 1866
legislation specifically guaranteed to all citizens equal rights to buy and
hold real and personal property.74 This right of owning and possessing
realty was one of the most significant aspects of the legislation.
The first Supreme Court decision on the question of whether or not
the Plessy doctrine could be utilized to validate racial residential segre-
gation came in 1917-Buchanan v. Warley.75 Louisville enacted an ordi-
nance76 prohibiting members of one race from occupying a residence in
any block inhabited by a majority of the other race. In a suit for specific
performance, a white seller sought to enforce an agreement of sale
which provided that the purchaser was not bound to consummate the
deal unless he could occupy the premises as a residence. The purchaser
71. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1927).
72. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
73. ,Cf. Sipeul v. University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
74. 14 STAT. 27 § 1 (1866).
75. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
76. Ordinance of the City of Louisville approved May 11, 1914; an analysis of the
"Municipal Segregation Ordinances," as these are termed, is given in Harris v. City of
Louisville, 165 Ky. 559, -, 177 S.W. 472, 474-76 (1915).
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was a Negro. The defense rested on the ordinance. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals held for the defendant, relying on the separate but equal
doctrine.77 The Supreme Court reversed on appeal on the grounds that
the ordinance violated the fundamental rights guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment. The Court relied on the Civil Rights Act of 1866
in identifying these rights as including the right to sell, purchase, and
hold realty. The Court reaffirmed its position ten years later.78
The desire to add legal force to the concept of homogeneous neigh-
borhoods did not die with Buchanan. The separate but equal doctrine
was urged at the state level as a justification for segregated housing
achieved through the use of restrictive covenants. Thus, the Missouri
Court specifically relied upon Plessy in upholding the legality of such
an agreement against a challenge based on the principle that a direct
restraint on the alienation of land was ultra Lires.79 In a 1926 decision,
Corrigan v. Buckley, 0 a restrictive covenant involving residential realty
and banning Negroes therefrom was upheld as constitutional. Op-
ponents of the covenant had urged that it was an indirect violation of
Buchanan v. Warley.s' The Court ignored the argument and, instead,
declared that the Reconstruction Amendments did not prohibit contracts
respecting the control and disposition of property. 2 Earlier the Court
of Appeals had proclaimed:
... the constitutional right of a negro to acquire, own, and oc-
cupy property does not carry with it the constitutional power to
compel sale and conveyance to him of any particular private prop-
erty. The individual citizen, whether he be black or white, may re-
fuse to sell or lease his property to any particular individual or
class of individuals. The state alone possesses the power to compel
a sale or taking of private property, and that only for public use.83
Corrigan is a second only to Plessy and the Civil Rights Cases in foster-
ing discrimination by segregation of the races. ".... [M] any years [were
to elapse] before the crucial issue of the right to judicially enforce such
restrictions was considered by the Supreme Court. Possibly this was, in
77. Harris v. City of Louisville, 165 Ky. 559, 177 S.W. 472 (Ct. App. 1915).
78. Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927). See also City of Richmond v. Deans, 281
U.S. 704 (1930); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
79. Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918).
80. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
81. Id. at 324.
82. Id. at 331.
83. Corrigan v. Buckley, 299 F. 899, 901 (1924).
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part, due to the language used by the Supreme Court in Corrigan v.
Buckley.... " 84
As late as 1949, the New York Court held that the right to buy and
occupy realty was not a civil right and that a constitutional provision 9
prohibiting discrimination against persons in the exercise of their civil
rights because of race or religion by another private person was not
violated by a redevelopment company's discrimination against Negroes
in refusing to rent space in a housing project.86 The case is particu-
larly interesting since the project was erected on land that had been
condemned and sold to the corporation under the slum clearance pro-
gram of the City of New York. The corporation had enjoyed a twenty-
five year tax exemption as stimulus to its activity in participating in the
program.
Many states have enacted statutes proscribing marriage between par-
ties of different races. Prior to 1967, the constitutionality of these
statutes had never been passed upon by the United States Supreme
Court. State and lower federal courts had upheld these statutes as a
reasonable exercise of police powers.8 7 It should be recalled that this
was the justification adopted by the Court in Plessy. No doubt, the
underlying spirit of Plessy influenced these judicial decisions which
curtailed both the right to discriminate and the right to be free from
discrimination when exercised by a private person.
Of course the 'separate but equal' rule was clearly inapplicable to the
right to vote. The right was clearly spelled out in the fifteenth
amendment5 8 Here the Court found no difficulty in also applying the
equal protection of the laws principle.8 9 By the late forties, the right to
freedom from private discrimination was also established with regard
to labor union activities. 0 It should be remembered, however, that
unionism became a tremendous force in American life after the 1930
84. Supra note 56 at 1138-39.
85. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11.
86. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 NE.2d 541 (Sup. Ct.
1949, aff'd., 274 App. Div. 992, 85 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981
(1950).
87. See, State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871); Stevens v. United States 146 F.2d 120
(10th Cir. 1944).
88. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1.
89. Nixon v. Herdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); see also following section infra-The
Growth of State Action in Private Affairs.
90. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive F. & E., 338 U.S. 332 (1949);
see also following section infra-The Growth of State Action in Private Affairs.
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depression and that de facto segregation in craft trade associations still
exists today. The most significant area of application of the constitu-
tionalized right to be free from ethnic discrimination was the invali-
dating of legislation having an injurious effect upon a particular group,
in their enjoyment of a commercial activity. However the decisions,.
while acknowledging abridgment of the right of equal protection of the
laws, seem equally based upon the due process clause.91 Predilection over
property rights rather than a concern for freedom from discrimination
probably motivated the Court in this area.
A New Breadth of Life
We already mentioned that the first half of the twentieth century
was a period in which the right to discriminate was virtually unfettered.
Even the area of state activity was infected by the concept of segre-
gation developed under the title of separate but equal treatment. The
constitutionalized right of freedom from discrimination was not a
cogent factor shaping the melting pot. We have described it as the
forgotten relative. A new breadth of life was infused into the equal
protection clause in 1954 with a decision of the Supreme Court which
affected the entire jurisprudence of discrimination.
The decision was Brown v. Board of Education.2 The precise hold-
ing of the Court was that the separate but equal doctrine had no place-
in the field of public education. The philosophy of the decision was
that segregation per se denoted that some group, in this instance the
Negro, was inferior. Equality of physical facilities could not stamp out
inequality arising out of psychological discrimination against a minority
group. Stamping a minority group by the state with the badge of in-
feriority was a deprival of equal protection of the laws. The constitu-
tionalized right to be free from discrimination included the right not
to be racially or ethnically segregated; for segregation was the means of
marking one of the separated groups as inferior and therefore not en-
tided to the equal protection of the laws.
Segregation as a philosophy of interpreting equal protection of the
laws received a death blow in this decision. Though the case was
confined to education, its effects had to be pervasive. It ushered in a
new era in which equal protection of the laws unqualified by segrega-
tion principles would dominate the decisions of the Supreme Court in
91. See, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 186 U.S. 356 (1886); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'r,
334 U.S. 410 (1948).
92. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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-the area of discrimination. The right to be free from discrimination
would extend wherever state action extended. As the influence of gov-
ermnent expanded, the right of freedom from discrimination would
take on renewed vigor. With the decision in the Brown case, it was
only a matter of time before the effects of the right to be free from
•discrimination would curtail efforts of private individuals to practice
-discrimination. The year 1954 marks the calendar date when the pen-
•dulum, in the balance between the right to discriminate and the right
to be free from discrimination, began favoring the latter right over the
.former. The pendulum has moved and continues to move slowly and
with occasional regressions along the course of enhancement of the
right of freedom from discrimination. Correspondingly, the right to
-discriminate will progressively diminish in significance. Ironically, fu-
ture developments in the law may require that the Court rescue the
right to discriminate from extinction by attrition.
Within two years of the Bro'wn decision, the separate but equal doc-
trine of Plessy had no applicability in the field of public transportation.
'he Supreme Court, relying on the Brown decision, affirmed a district
court93 ruling that state statutes and municipal ordinances requiring
segregation on city busses was an unconstitutional deprivation of equal
protection of the laws.94 An earlier decision by a federal court of appeals
specifically declared that segregation of the races by common carriers,
pursuant to the authority of Plessy v. Ferguson, was an unconstitutional
abridgment of the right of freedom from discrimination. 95
In 1955 a federal court of appeals enjoined the enforcement of racial
segregation in the enjoyment of public beaches and bathhouses., The
court rejected segregation in recreational activities as a proper exercise
of the police power of the state. Earlier precedents predicated on the
Plessy doctrine were overruled. Equality had to be measured in the
opinion of the court not only by tangible factors but by psychological
conditions generated by segregation. The United States Supreme Court
in a per curiam decision upheld the position of the lower court.97
Segregation of restaurant facilities was declared by the court in 1963
an unconstitutional abridgment of the right to be free from discrimina-
tion when commanded by city ordinance, even though the manager
93. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (D.C. Ala. 1956).
94. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
95. Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co, 224 F.2d 752 (1955).
96. Dawson v. Baltimore City, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cit. 1955).
97. 350 U.S.877 (1955).
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thereof would have acted to enforce segregation in the absence of an
ordinance 8 The Court asserted that wherever a state agency compels
discrimination on account of race the equal protection clause is violated.
The right to be free from discrimination received a temporary set-
back in the field of business regulations. A federal court of appeals
upheld the right of a private hospital to exclude Negro physicians,
solely on account of their race, from staff privileges, though the hos-
pital was built on grounds donated by the city."" Certiorari was denied
by the Supreme Court.100 The temporary character of the decision and
the inaction of the Supreme Court can best be gauged by a 1963 de-
cision holding that Negro physicians and dentists could not be dis-
criminated against by private institutions receiving federal and state
funds. 101 The federal court of appeals in this instance struck as un-
constitutional a provision in the Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Con-
struction Act 1 2 which permitted the surgeon-general to authorize the
release of funds to private recipients that maintained separate but equal
facilities. The basis of the action of the court was the equal protection
clause. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court,0 3 this time creat-
ing an opposite effect..
Anti-miscegenation legislation was developed to preserve white su-
premacy. Marital relationships between Negroes and whites were for-
bidden in many Southern States on theory of equal application of the
laws.
Thus, the State contends that, because its miscegenation statutes
punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an
interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial
classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination upon
race.
104
At the end of 1966, anti-miscegenation statutes existed in 16 states.'
98. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
99. Eaton v. Board of Managers, 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958).
100. 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
101. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
102. 60 STAT. 1041 (1946), as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 291e (f) (19-).
103. 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
104. Lovings v. Virginia, 87 Sup. Ct. 1817, 1821 (1967).
105. Id. at 1820 note 5 lists the 16 states with statutes outlawing interracial marriage:
Alabama, Ala. Const. Art. IV, § 102, Ala. Code, Tit. 14, § 360 (1958);
Arkansas, Ark. Star. Ann. § 55-104 (1947); Delaware, Del. Code Ann., Tit.
13, § 101 (1953); Florida, Fla. Const., Art. 16, § 24, F.S.A., Fla. Stat. Ann.
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In 1967 in Loving v. Virginia,"°6 the Supreme Court declared such
legislation unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause. It
specifically repudiated the equal application doctrine rooted in Plessy.
We have discussed only a few of the cases that have adopted the
Brown decision as their premise. 1 7 The cases, considered, all involved
state action. The pattern that emanates from these decisions is that of
judicial abhorrence to racial segregation in state activities. The impact
of this pattern has significance in the context of the conflict between
the right to discriminate and the right to be free from. discrimination
when evaluated with the growth of state action in private affairs, that
commenced around 1950. The exclusion of the principle of segregation
in interpreting the equal protection clause has been appreciably ex-
tended by the growth of judicial awareness of the role of the state in
the daily affairs of men. Brown v. Board of Education can only be ap-
preciated when read in the light of the history of the struggle in the
last decade and a half to curtail the obstructing effects of the state
action concept. In the following section, we will discuss that history.
THE GROWTH OF STATE ACTION IN PRIVATE AFFAIRS
In the last two decades judicial recognition of the role of the state in
the private affairs of all persons has paved the road for progressive ex-
pansion of a legally recognized and enforced right to be free from dis-
crimination. Cognizance by the judiciary of the presence of the state
in private affairs has and is removing the concept of state action as an
obstructing barrier to the application of the principle of equal protec-
tion of the laws to private affairs. This judicial temperament has
manifested itself in three areas: a) judiciol enforcement of the right of
a private person to commit a discriminatory act, b) significant involve-
§ 741.11 (1964); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 53-106 (1961); Kentucky, Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.020 (Supp. 1966); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit.
14, § 79 (1951); Mississippi, Miss. Const. Art. 14, § 263, Miss. Code Ann.
S 459 (1956); Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 451.020 (Supp. 1966), V.A. M.S.;
North Carolina, N.C. Const., Art. XIV, § 8, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-181 (1953);
Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 43, § 12 (1954); South Carolina, S.C.
Const., Art. 3, § 33, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7 (1962); Tennessee, Tenn. Const.,
Art. 11, § 14, Tenn. Code Ann. 36-402 (1955); Vernon's Ann. Texas, Tex.
Penal Code, Art. 492 (1952); West Virginia, V. Va. Code Ann. § 4697
(1961).
106. Id. at 1823.
107. For a digest of cases on the topic of discrimination and segregation after Brown,
see the following annotations: 100 L. Ed. 488 (1955); 3 L. Ed.2d 1556 (1958); 6 L. Ed.
2d 1302 (1960); 10 L. Ed.2d 1105 (1962); 15 L. Ed.2d 990 (1965).
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ment of the state in acts of private discrimination, and c) performance
of public functions by private persons. In all of these areas, the courts
have found the requisite state action.
Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Discriminate Equals State
Action
The first decision to deal with the problem of whether or not the
right to discriminate, when exercised by private persons, could be ju-
dicially enforced occurred in 1948-Shelley v. Kraemer.10 8
Shelley, a Negro, purchased residential property in the City of Saint
Louis, Missouri. At the time of the purchase, the property had been
subject to a covenant running with the land which limited its occu-
pancy to Caucasians. The covenant had been duly executed and re-
corded prior to the purchase. Adjacent property owners, signatories of
the covenant, sued to enforce its terms by restraining Shelley or any
other Negro acting in privity with him from occupying the premises.
The Missouri Supreme Court, en banc, ordered the trial court to
grant the relief requested. 10 9
The constitutional issue presented to the Supreme Court of the United
States was -whether the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive
covenants based on race or color. The Court's opinion proceeded
from the premise that the right to own, dispose, and enjoy property
was protected from state discrimination according to the terms of 'the
equal protection clause. It conceded that the equal protection clause
was not applicable where state action was absent; therefore, the re-
strictive covenants, standing alone, were valid property rights that could
be effectuated by voluntary adherence. However, the Court limited
these rights drastically.
It has been recognized that the action of state courts in enforcing
a substantive common-law rule formulated by those courts, may
result in the denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, even though the judicial proceedings in such cases may have
been in complete accord with the most rigorous conception of
procedural due process."
108. 334U.S. 1 (1947).
109. 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679 (1946).
110. Supra note 108 at 17.
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In other words, the Court could not perceive state action in the act
of formulating a common law rule which conferred a property right
that could be employed by a private person to achieve the object of
racial discrimination since the "Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." 111 It
was not until state action manifested itself in the coercive power of
judicial enforcement of a common law property right that the equal
protection clause became relevant and effective in restraining discrimi-
nation.
Judicial enforcement of the right to discriminate on racial grounds
through a restrictive covenant amounted to state action. Since the
right to be free from discrimination in the owning and using of property
is within the purview of the equal protection clause, the Court found
that enforcement in the case at bar, amounting to state action, was an
abridgment of constitutional freedom.
Six years later the modern-day rule in the Shelley case was extended
to provide a defense to a Caucasian seller in an action for damages.112
It was only logical for the Court to hold that the suit at law constituted
state action just as much as equitable intervention in behalf of a restric-
tive covenant based on race.
The unique feature of the Barrows [the suit for damages] case is
that respondent Jackson was not invoking her Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to the equal protection of the laws as a defense against
the suit. Rather, she was in effect invoking the Fourteenth
Amendment right of non-Caucasians as a class [a class to which
she was not a member]113
The defendant in the suit at law was Caucasian. State action was found
in enforcing her right to enter into a contract in which she voluntarily
undertook a duty to discriminate on a racial basis, a duty that the Court
continued to recognize as legally binding but quite unenforceable. The
traditional policies of the court regarding standing to sue were brushed
aside.
To the skeptic sophomore in jurisprudence who wondered what
value there was in a right without a remedy, the Court was fully pre-
111. Id. at 13.
112. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
113. Hartman, Constitutionally Guaranteed Civil Rights as a Limitation on Private
Action, 26 ZEITSCHRIFT FiOR AuSLXNDISCHFS OFFENTLmcHEs RrcIr vD V6LKERRECHT 630,
-651 (1966).
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pared to affirm its value and in fact did so one year later in Rice v. Sioux
City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.114 Sargeant Rice, a Winnebago
Indian, was returned to the United States for burial after being killed
in the Korean War. Arrangements were made for his interment at
the Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery. The remains were taken to
the cemetery where graveside services were conducted. At that point,
the cemetery halted proceedings and refused burial on the grounds that
the contract of sale of the burial lot provided that it could be used to
bury the remains only of Caucasians. The limitation on use was in
the nature of a restrictive covenant. Mrs. Rice, widow of the deceased
veteran, sued the cemetery for damages on the theory of tortious
liability in the infliction of mental distress. The defense relied upon
the restrictive covenant. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the
covenant was not violative of the equal protection clause and there-
fore could be introduced as a satisfactory defense to the alleged
cause of action." 5 In so ruling, the Court rested its decision on the
theory that Shelley involved the exertion of governmental power direct-
ly in aid of discrimination whereas the case at bar involved only pri-
vate action. The cemetery did not invoke the aid of the state and
therefore the court concluded that state action could not possibly be
present.
It is fundamental in our law that a private individual may, unless
expressly forbidden by police power enactments, deal freely with
whom he pleases, and his reasons or policy are not the concern of
the state. The state may not aid him in certain of his restrictive or
arbitrary agreements, and so here if plaintiff had herself, lowered
her deceased husband's body into the ground in violation of her
agreement with defendants, the State would have had to deny de-
fendants aid in restraining her, nor could it have helped in punish-
ing her for violating that agreement." 06
It was a decision embodying this reasoning that was affirmed in 1954
by an equally divided Supreme Court," 7 which failed to comprehend
the inconsistency of such action with the Barrows case.
In allowing the restrictive covenant to be introduced as a defense to
a common law cause of action, state action was in fact present to the
114. 348 U. S. 880 (1954).
115. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953).
116. Id. at 117.
117. 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
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precise degree as if there had been a suit in the covenant. A year later
the Court vacated its prior judgment"8l and dismissed the writ of cer-
tiorari as improvidently granted because of subsequent legislation enacted
by Iowa." 9
A North Carolina decision in 1955 is illustrative of the curious re-
sults flowing from the Sbelley decision. 2 ° Land had been deeded to the
City of Charlotte, North Carolina, to be used for park facilities for
white people only. Provision was made that "said lands shall revert
in fee simple to the undersigned donors." The city permitted Negroes
to use a golf course located within the limits of the park. Heirs of the
donor petitioned for a declaratory judgment vesting ownership, free of
any limitation, in themselves on the theory that the conveyance con-
stituted a fee simple determinable with a possibility of reverter vested in
the grantor and upon his death in his successor.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that the petitioners'
theory was correct. Since the operation of the reversion provision was
not by judicial enforcement but effectuated a change of ownership
automatically, Shelley v. Kraemer had no application. The tenor of the
opinion has earmarks of the most pedestrian Aristotelian logic. The
Court noted:
We know of no law that prohibits a white man from conveying a
free determinable upon the limitation that it shall not be used by
members of any race except his own, nor of any law that prohibits
a Negro from conveying a fee determinable upon the limitation
that it shall not be used by members of any race, except his
own.
12 1
The court took efforts to distinguish its ruling from an earlier decision
involving a condition subsequent, a violation of which does not auto-
matically work a forfeiture. 22 Had the deed been in the form of a
condition subsequent, enforcement of the condition would have been
held by this court to amount to state action. The Supreme Court did
not deem the case worthy of review.12
118. 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
119. IowA CODE ANN., § 566A.1-II (Supp. 1954).
120. Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 SE.2d 114
(1955).
121. Id. at 123.
122. Barnard v. Bowen, 214 N.C. 121, 198 SZE. 584 (1938).
123. Leeper v. Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
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At this point in this article it is worthwhile to reflect what an earlier
Court had said in holding the formal distinctions pertaining to the
law of property irrelevant in the field of taxation.
"Nothing is to be gained," it was said, "by multiplying words in
respect of the various niceties of the art of conveyancing or the
law of contingent and vested remainders. . . ." It [the Court] re-
fused to subordinate the plain purposes of a modern fiscal measure
to the wholly unrelated origins of the recondite learning of ancient
property law.124
It is the height of absurdity to assume that constitutional rights but
not taxation should depend on "the recondite learning of ancient prop-
erty law." Yet the recondite learning of property law has been deter-
mining the presence or absence of state action for purposes of guarantee-
ing freedom from discrimination under the equal protection clause.
Another interesting decision of 1955 was Gordon v. Gordon,12 5 where-
in a probate court in Massachusetts was called upon to give effect to
a provision in a will which revoked any bequest made to any child of
the testator who married a "person not born in the Hebrew faith." The
position of the affected beneficiary was that the enforcement of such
a provision in a probate proceeding amounted to state action in violation
of the equal protection clause. In support of this position, the bene-
ficiary relied principally on the Sbelley-Barrows line of decisions. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the beneficiary's argument, as-
serting that the Shelley case was altogether inapplicable to problems of
devolution of property. The Supreme Court of the United States with-
held a writ of certiorari.26
The Massachusetts court failed to acknowledge that judicial action
was necessary to give legal effect to a will. The right to make a will
is not inherent in the concept of property. Without judicial action none
of the beneficiaries of a will could succeed to any of the fruits of the
instrument. Thus the court in admitting a will to probate and enforcing
its terms was enforcing private discrimination based on religion. There
is as much state action in such practices as in enforcing restrictive
covenants. The fact of the matter is that probating of a will per se
involves enforcement of private discrimination, for every will reflects
the prejudices and personal tastes of its maker. The issue is whether or
124. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1940).
125. 12 NZE.2d 230 (1955).
126. 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
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not the right to will shall be extinguished by the Shelley-Barrows doc-
trine. The Massachusetts decision was an effort directed more at pre-
serving the right to bequeath property than to implement logically the
necessary consequences of Shelley.
' The year 1956 witnessed both a setback for and a reaffirmation of
the rule that judicial enforcement of the right to discriminate equals
state action. Cutter Laboratories had fired an employee on the grounds
that she was a member, of the Communist Party and this constituted
"just cause" for discharge under a contract between the company and
the union representing the employee. The California Supreme Court
refused to enforce an arbitration award stating that the union had
waived its rights. 1
The Supreme Court dismissed the possibility of a substantial federal
question and regarded the contract provision concerning reasons for
discharge as a matter of purely local law.' 28 The Court failed to recog-
nize that the state court was enforcing a contract that was discrimina-
tory in character. Justice Douglas highlighted this fact in his dissent,
citing the Shelley-Barrows decisions. He illustrated his point by this
hypothetical:
A union enters into a collective-bargaining agreement with an em-
ployer that allows any employee who is a Republican to be dis-
charged for "just cause." Employers can, of course, hire whom
they choose, arranging for an all-Democratic labor force if they
desire. But the courts may not be implicated in such a discrimina-
tory scheme. Once the courts put their imprimatur on such a
contract, government, speaking through the judicial branch, acts.1
The Court did not extend the Shelley doctrine to the threshold of
the hiring gate of an employer who under the equal protection clause
remains free to practice discrimination.
In Lynch v. Uhlenhopp,30 the Iowa Supreme Court refused to en-
force a child custody agreement incorporated into a divorce decree
stipulating that child whose custody was awarded to the wife "shall be
reared in the Roman Catholic Religion." The court distinguished the
Rice case on the basis that the contract therein was used merely as a
defense whereas in the case at bar the contract was being enforced, and
127. 43 Cal.2d 807, 278 P.2d 916 (1956).
128. 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
129. ld. at 302.
130. 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956).
-1967]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the enforcement of a contract discriminating against non-Catholic re-
ligion was state action-a clear violation of the Shelley rule.
The nineteen sixties witnessed a startling development in the Shelley-
Barrows rule. Abstract Investynent Co. v. Hutchinson13' held that ju-
dicial enforcement of an unlawful detainer action against a month-to-
month tenant, who was being evicted because of his race, amounted to
state action and was in violation of the equal protection clause. The
ruling was allegedly predicated on the Shelley-Barrows principle that
the court cannot enforce a landlord's right to possession when that right
was being invoked on a racially discriminatory basis.
The Abstract case was obviously not only an application but an ex-
tension of the Shelley rule. Its effect was to alter an essential principle
of landlord-tenant relationship, i.e., a month-to-month tenancy could be
terminated by either party for any arbitrary reason whatsoever. Here-
after it would be subject to the qualification that the termination could
not effectuate racial discrimination.
The California court cited the oft-repeated principle that acts gen-
erally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlaw-
ful end. Thus, the constitutional right to property cannot be used to
attain an unconstitutional result. In order to avoid racial discrimination,
the court imposed a legal relationship on the parties. Contrast this action
to Shelley where a legal relationship was removed to further freedom
from discrimination. An additional distinction should be noted in the
fact that the tenant, as a condition to commencing any kind of legal
relationship with the landlord, voluntarily agreed that the reasons for
terminating the tenancy should be irrelevant.
The import of the decision is that both the remedy and the right as-
serted against another must be free from the taint of racial discrimination.
The common law rule, as well as the remedy, was impregnated with the
equal protection clause. This was a far cry from what the author of the
Shelley rule intended. It is a sound recognition that state action inheres
in common law rules just as much as in the judicial enforcement of
these principles. Such recognition constitutes a blow to the weakest link
in the Shelley decision-the possibility of a legal right without a judicial
remedy.
The mechanical application of a formula which would find the
requisite state action whenever the state enforces private rights has
proven itself an unworkable failure as a test for determining when private
acts must be free from discrimination.
131. 204 Ct. App.2d 242, 22 Cal. Rpr. 309 (1962).
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Shelley and Barrows had left the Court with a constitutional doc-
trine of sweeping scope, uncritically adopted, its implications un-
plumbed. Much can be admired in the effort to add force to Mr.
Justice Harlan's noble dictum, "Our Constitution is color-blind."
But with a short-sighted approach, unforeseen pitfalls could well
be expected. They were not long in showing up. 3 2
The principal source of difficulty in utilizing the test consisted in the
failure of the Supreme Court to appreciate the presence of state action
in formulating rules of the common law that define rights and duties.
If the rule in Shelley's case was carried to its logical extreme, a private
home owner would not be able to eject someone from his premises with
the aid of the police if his actions were motivated by racial discrimina-
tion.13 Our society is not prepared to tolerate such an infringement of
our liberty to discriminate. The Constitution was never designed to
eliminate discrimination as a personal right. Failure of the courts to
apply the Shelley-Barrovws doctrine in matters of devolution of property
was an acknowledgement that other competing rights protected by the
common law were just as valuable to society as the concept of equal
protection of the laws. The distinction between a fee simple deter-
minable and a condition subsequent as a criterion for the presence of
constitutional rights appears at best to be quite ridiculous and to vindi-
cate Dickens' comment that "The Law is an Ass." If private rights are
stripped of the support of judicial enforcement, self-help and public
chaos will necessarily result.
The Shelley principle reaffirms state action as a line of demarcation
between liberty and equal protection of the laws; further, it defines
state action as the judicial enforcement of private rights. Whatever the
test may be for reconciling the competing claims of these two constitu-
tional rights, this formula should be discarded as a useless tool.
Significant Involvement of the State in the Acts of Private
Discrimination Equals State Actions
The patience of the Negro, waiting for the fulfillment of promises
declared by the White Establishment in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and offered by it as a justification for the Civil War, had been
worn out to a razor thin edg6 by the nineteen sixties. A sit-in demon-
132. St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action,
Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MicH. L. RE:v. 993, 1002 (1961).
133. Cf. Tyson v. Gazes, 238 F. Supp. 937 (ED. La. 1965).
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stration occurred on February 1, 1960, in Greensboro, North Carolina.
It marked the date of the birth of militant agitation to make American
society recognize the principles of liberty and equality to which so
much lip service has been paid. Congress and the Office of the Presi-
dency seemed sympathetic but unresponsive to the demands of the
alienated masses of Negroes. The promise of gradual desegregation had
turned into what was laughingly described as tokenism. The early
sixties were offering the judiciary an unprecedented opportunity for
bold and creative leadership in attacking the problems generated by
acts of racial discrimination practiced in the allegedly private sector of
human life.
The courts, unfortunately, but quite obviously, were ill-prepared to
cope with the new challenge to the status quo. The state action con-
cept was embedded solidly in our Constitution by generations of ju-
dicial acquiescence. The possibility of a re-examination of this idea was
so highly improbable that even the most ardent civil rights advocates
conceded that all arguments had to be predicated upon the fundamental
distinction between state and private discrimination enunciated in the
Civil Rights Cases.'1 Nevertheless, many scholars could clearly see by
the early sixties that the rule in Shelley amounted to an ill-conceived
plan for deciding which acts of private discrimination were constitu-
tional and which violated the equal protection clause.' 35 Jurists were
given pause in applying the Shelley-Barrows doctrine as doubts con-
cerning its soundness continued to manifest themselves.
However, the problem of formulating a new definition for the state
action concept would require a substantial period of time for judicious
reflection. Evolution of a new principle that could be applied with
predicable results would demand a re-examination of many fundamental
notions of jurisprudence glossed into our Constitution with the passage
of time. Meanwhile some stop-gap measure would have to be adopted
to supplement, if not supplant, Shelley as the exigencies of each day
created new crises for the Court. That measure was formulated in
1961 with the decision of retired Justice Tom Clark in Burton v. City of
Wilmington Pkg. Authority.138
134. Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the 'State Action' Limit on the
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 859-65 (1966).
135. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HIARv. L. REv.
1 (1959); Henkin, Shelley v. Kramer: Notes For a Rezised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 473 (1962); St. Antoine, supra note 132.
136. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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That case involved a publicly built, owned, and operated off-street
parking garage, space in which was leased by a state agency for stores
and a restaurant as a means of securing the necessary capital to finance
the construction costs of, the facility. The rented areas could in no
sense be regarded as surplus property. They were an integral part of
the facility though direct public access from the garage was not pro-
.vided. Fixtures installed by the lessee restaurant became the property
of the state and accordingly enjoyed a tax exempt status. The restau-
rant and the garage were complementary to each other in serving the
-needs ofan automotive public. The building was clearly marked as
,public property.
In August, 1958, the restaurant refused to serve the petitioner, a
Negro, -because of his color. Action was instituted on the theory that
such refusal constituted a deprival of equal.protection of the laws. The
'Supreme Court of Delaware refused a petition for declaratory relief
asserting -that the discrimination was purely private in character. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed and remanded the case.
In arriving at its decision the Court opined that the equal protection
clause was. violated only when the state became significantly involved
in the individual invasion of rights guaranteed by the equal protection
clause. The Court did not articulate any formula for pin-pointing sig-
nificant involvement. It satisfied itself with the cautionary statement that
,'sifting facts and weighing circumstances" were the only means by
which the true significance could be attributed to what would other-
wise appear to be "nonobvious involvement of the State in private con-
duct." 137 Significant involvement was a matter of degree and the pres-
ence of state action was a matter of degree.
The Court applied this principle of significant involvement equaling
state action by culling out every fact that bridged the gulf between
private action and public operations. The court stressed that the leased
areas constituted a "physically and financially integral and, indeed, in-
dispensable part of the State's plan to operate its project as a self sustain-
ing unit." 138 The approach of Clark is best summarized in the following
passage:
-By- its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not
only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but-has elected
to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted dis-
-37I Id. ft-722.
138. Id. at 723-24.
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crimination. The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with Eagle [the restaurant] that it must be recog-
nized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on
that account cannot be considered to have been so "purely pri-
vate" as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 3 9
Inaction was thought of as state action. The totality of circumstances
surrounding the construction warranted the conclusion that the state
was a co-partner in discrimination
The opinion "was a model of circumspection, if not irresolution." 140
The Court itself concedes that its conclusions are not to be regarded
as universal criteria for evaluating every leasing agreement by a state.
Since inaction is potentially state action and every overt private act
carries with it some sort of legal implications (at least that it is legal),
the significant involvement test has left with the Court the power to
determine arbitrarily what private acts involve the state. A decision
of this character is apt to be measured by the length of the Chancellor's
foot. It does afford an opportunity for judicial relief of exacerbating
conditions of discrimination based on race without the Court having
to supply a substantial reason justifying the interposition of the equal
protection clause in the legality of private actions. It will serve as a
handy weapon in hard cases but has failed to provide that rule of law
for which a democratic and free nation searches as a guide to its actions.
• * . The distinction contribution which courts can make to shap-
ing our history is in their reasoned articulation of enduring prin-
ciples. We must demand from our courts, and particularly from
our strongest courts, a willingness to confront hard questions and
a careful adherence to reasoned argument. A court that fails to
meet that basic obligation . . . assumes the role of the purely
political branches of government.' 4 '
The uselessness of the test as a predicable means for ascertaining the
presence of state action under the fourteenth amendment appears as
any attempt to answer the following questions is undertaken. Is the
state itself commiting discrimination by authorizing an individual to
139. Id. at 725.
140. St. Antoine, supra note 132 at 1005-06.
141. Horowitz & Karst, The Proposition Fourteen Cases: Justice in Search of a Justi-
fication, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 37, 51 (1966).
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engage in acts of this character? What should be the result if the state
permits discrimination by inaction? Restated, the issue is: Should au-
thorization or even permission by inaction constitute such significant
involvement in the acts of private discrimination as to equal the presence
of state action? Burton failed to provide us with any inkling concerning
where the Court will strike its line of demarcation between private and
state action.
The influence of Burton can clearly be seen in Justice White's con-
curring opinion in Evans v. NeWton 42 and in his opinion in behalf of
the majority of the Court in Mulkey v. Reitman.43 Both opinions ad-
dressed themselves to the "peculiar facts and circumstances" 144 war-
ranting the conclusion that the state was significantly involved in acts
of private discrimination. The peculiar facts and circumstances culled
in each case could hardly be described as weighty and persuasive,
logically inducing the results.
In Evans v. Newton, 45 a tract of land had been devised in 1911 to
the City of Macon, Georgia, on condition that it be used as a park for
white people only. Segregation was practiced thereon until 1963 when
it was abandoned by municipal authorities who regarded its enforcement
as an unconstitutional act. The Board of Managers of the park under
the testamentary trust sued to remove the city as trustee and appoint
appropriate successors. Negro residents of the city intervened, claiming
that the limitation in the devise was void under the fourteenth amend-
ment, and that a new trustee should not be appointed because such ap-
pointment was an attempt to implement the racially restrictive character
of the devise. From an adverse decision, the intervenors petitioned for
a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The writ was granted and the
Court annulled the appointment of successor trustees. Justice White
concurred in a separate opinion, finding that state action was significant-
ly involved in the private act of discrimination by the devisor.
To sustain his conclusion, White reviewed the history of the common
law and statutory regulation of charitable trusts in Georgia. According
to White a charitable trust exists when the purposes of the trust are
beneficial to members of the community generally and not merely for
the benefit of a class of persons. This was interpreted as requiring a
generality of user beneficaries-a generality in which no portion of the
142. 382 U.S. 296, 302-12 (1965).
143. 87 Sup. Ct. 1627 (1967).
144. Burton, supra note 136 at 726.
145. Evans, supra note 142.
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public was excluded. No specific Georgia case had interpreted the
social purpose of a charitable trust thusly; the construction was the
product of White's understanding of trust law in general.146 He ob-
served, however, that the scope of social purpose of a charitable trust
was colored by doubt. "On the whole, therefore, I conclude that prior
to . . .legislation it would have been extremely doubtful whether ...
a trust for park purposes [was authorized by law] when a portion of
the public was excluded from the park." "47
White identified the necessary legislation as having been passed by
Georgia in 1905, six years prior to the drafting of the settlor's will.
Sections 69-504 and 69-505 of the Georgia Code authorized charitable
trusts for parks in which the settlor could "by appropriate limitations
and conditions, provide that use of said park . . .so conveyed to said
municipality shall be limited to the white race only.., or to the colored
race only. ... " 148 The statute did not expressly specify any other kind
of discrimination. It did not expressly coerce discrimination.
Justice White ruled that the state was involved to " 'a significant
extent' in bringing about the discriminatory provision in Senator Bacon's
trust..... ." 149 He arrived at this conclusion by the following reasoning:
Nevertheless, if the validity of the racial condition in Senator
Bacon's trust would have been in doubt but for the 1905 statute
and if ihe statute removed such doubt only for racial restrictions,
leaving the validity of nonracial restrictions still in question, the
absence of coercive language in the legislation would not prevent
application of the Fourteenth Amendment. For such a statute
would depart from a policy of strict neutrality in matters of private
discrimination by enlisting the State's assistance only in aid of racial
.discrimination and would so involve the State in the private choice
as to convert the infected private discrimination into state action
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment80 [italics supplied].
The specious character of this reasoning is obvious. It assumes that
146. Exclusion of a portion of the public does not render a charitable trust invalid
as such under some circumstances: "When the purpose of the trust is charitable and
the class of persons who are to receive the benefits under the trust is sufficiently large,
a trust is charitable even though the number of recipients of benefits is limited both
horizontally and vertically.' IV Scorr, TRusrs 5 375.1 (2d ed. 1956).
147. Evans, supra note 142 at 310.
148. GA. CODE ANN., tit. 69 §§ 504-05 (1957).
149. Supra note 147 at 311.
150. Id. at 306.
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acts of private racial discrimination are not authorized by the state
through common law rules that enable the individual to discriminate; but
the state becomes a partner in the act of discrimination when it clarifies
these rules by statutes. The opinion fails to provide a substantial reason
justifying the interposition of the equal protection clause in private acts
of discrimination.
But is there any legal significance in the passage of statutes which
authorizes what the common law already authorizes? If this is en-
couragement, it is encouragement solely by publicizing the law
which already exists, and would hardly seem to have constitutional
significance.a 1
We 'are not persuaded that the statute in question departed from a
policy of strict neutrality in regard to acts of private discrimination by
tilting the scales in furtherance of such acts beyond the balance already
-struck by the state in the common law. If significant involvement is a
matter of degrees,1 5 2 the distance between the presence of state action
and its absence according to the opinion in this decision is imperceptible.
Mulkey v. Reitman15 concerned an action to restrain a landlord from
refusing to rent an apartment to the plaintiffs solely on the basis that
they were Negroes. The action asserted a statutory right under the
California Civil Code'54 banning private discriminatory acts in the letting
or selling of property. Summary judgment was entered for the defend-
ants on the grounds that the statutory right of action had been re-
pealed by the passage in a referendum of a constitutional amendment
affirming the "right" of a person to decline to sell or rent property "to,
such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses." 1'
An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of California, en banc,
which reversed the decision of the lower court on the theory that the
referendum significantly involved that state in an act of private di-
151. Williams, Mulkey v. Reitman and State Action, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 26, 27
(1966).
152. Id. at 34. The author states:
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority the Court accepted the issue
as one of degree, a significant change from prior analysis .... [Tihe issue
is not whether there is "state action" in any technical sense ... but whether
the state has affirmatively become a co-participant in the discrimination.
Id.
153. Supra note 143.
154. Unrah Civil Rights Act, CA. CiviL CODE §§ 51-52 (Supp. 1966).
155. CaL. CoNsT. art. 1 § 26 (Supp. 1966).
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crimination.ao The Supreme Court, per Justice White, upheld the
California appellate decision.
Significant involvement was established by an examination of the
facts culled from the legislative history of section 26, which tended to
prove that the purpose of the referendum measure was to repeal state
laws inhibiting sellers or landlords from practicing discrimination and
forestall future state action circumscribing the exercise of their discre-
tion. The fact that the repealing measure was a constitutional amend-
ment while the bar restricting racial discrimination was effectuated by
statute was significant in the eyes of the Court in fixing racial discrimi-
nation as one of the basic policies of the state.
Private discriminations in housing were now not only free from
Rumford and Unruh [Cal. Civ. Code § 51 and 52] but they also
enjoyed a far different status than was true before the passage of
those statutes. The right to discriminate, including the right to
discriminate on racial grounds, was now embodied in the State's
basic charter, immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regu-
lation at any level of the state government. Those practicing
racial discriminations need no longer rely solely on their personal
choice.15-
Neutrality had been upset because the repeal had been achieved by
constitutional amendment and not by statute. The influence of White's
opinion in Evans is clearly apparent. The source of state permissiveness
of private discrimination is a significant fact indicating involvement. One
wonders what the constitutional effect of a repealing statute would have
been.
Neutrality of the state was further upset because the totality of facts
underlying the adoption of the constitutional amendment established
state authorization of discrimination, which the opinion equates with
encouragement of discrimination. However, encouragement denotes an
act of assistance or inspiration to an individual to do something. En-
couragement connotes coercion of the individual to do that which is
inspired. It tilts the neutrality of the state in favor of discrimination in
preference to avoiding it. Authorization denotes an act empowering
someone to do something. It connotes freedom of the individual to do
or abstain from doing the act empowered. Empowering an individual
156. 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825 (1966).
157. Mulkey supra note 143 at 1632.
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to discriminate does not tilt the neutrality of the state in favor or against
private discrimination. It simply allows it to occur. Yet the opinion does
not explain why the fact of authorization signifies encouragement. Like
Burton it fails to provide a substantial justification for the interposition
of the equal protection clause in the legality of private actions. The
repeal did nothing more than return the law of California to the status
quo prior to adoption of the act banning discrimination in housing." s
Significant involvement has produced dissatisfaction for those seeking
to fix upon a test whereby the presence of state action could be iden-
tified. The dissatisfaction is due to the fact that significant involvement
is not a test of state action. When used, it is a conclusion that state
action is present. It reveals nothing of the reasons inducing the con-
clusion. As enunciated by the Court, the criterion of significant involve-
ment comes to a halt at the point of crucial inquiry: significant with
respect to what? Significant involvement requires a weighing of cor-
relative facts. The Court does not tell what facts are to be weighed or
what the rationality of the scale should be. Shelley and Burton have not
satisfied the need for a rational explanation for the balance our judicial
system strikes when it decrees the presence of state action or the
presence of purely personal action. A new test for ascertaining state
action is badly needed.
Performance of a Public Function by a Private Entity Equals
State Action
In applying the benefits of the equal protection clause, the Civil
Rights Cases pursued a two-step approach. Acts of private individuals
were observed to find out whether or not discrimination was present.
Secondly, the judiciary searched for the presence of action by an
institutionalized organ of the state. The action of the individual and the
action of the state were conceived of as distinct operations. For equal
protection of the laws to be applicable as a restrictive qualification of
158. In a companion case, Hill v. Miller, 413 P.2d 852, 50 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1966), the
California court upheld the eviction of a tenant by a landlord who specifically informed
the tenant in his notice to quit that the eviction was taking place because he was
electing "to exercise the right conferred upon me by Article I Section 26, California
Constitution, to rent said premises to members of the Caucasion race." Id. at 853,
50 Cal. Rptr. 908, 909. The distinction between Mulkey and Hill consisted in the fact
that statutory prohibitions on discrimination applied to the property in Mulkey and
not to that in Hill. Only in the instance of a tenant being protected by statutory modi-
fication of his common law freedom did he prevail in asserting his rights under the
equal protection clause,
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private acts, the presence of two different agents had to be manifestedt
in acts that were distinguishable, at least logically. Problems relating to,
discrimination fell into two categories: 1) those arising out of the con-
cept of state action; 2) those arising out of the concept of equal pro-
tection of the laws. A real dichotomy developed. Courts adhering to
the approach outlined above premised their decisions on the theory
that a private act could not be a state act and vice versa. In short, only
an institutionalized organ of the state was deemed capable of perform-
ing state action.
To some scholars this dichotomy obfuscated all efforts in their in-
ception to define the elusive concept of state action. As long as the
two-step approach advanced in the Civil Rights Cases was utilized, new
theories of state action would be spawned that would inevitably net
the disillusionment of Shelley. An approach different from that of the
Civil Rights Cases had to be developed before attempts to define state
action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment would be successful
-the traditional two-step method had to be disregarded.
The two-step method had failed because it did not account for the
concentrations of private power that developed after 1870. The impact
of privately concentrated power on the Constitution manifested itself
as a recurrent theme in the legal periodical literature of the fifties which
advocated a recognition that sovereign power could reside elsewhere
than the institutionalized state. 15 9 In short, a successful definition of
state action required a re-examination of basic political theory.
The new approach suggested for the search for state action would
look to the private individual and his action without recourse to some
connecting link to an institutionalized organ of government. It was a
methodology premised upon a pluralistic concept of sovereignty that
sought to account politically for the private concentrations of power
that came with industrialism.
The problem of political theory to which I refer concerns the
issue so much discussed by the political pluralists-that is by
Gierke, Maitland, Figgis, Laski. The heart of the pluralistic thesis
is the conviction that government must recognize that it is not the
sole possessor of sovereignty, and that private groups within the
community are entitled to lead their own free lives and exercise
159. Two outstanding examples of this literature are: Berle, The Changing Role of
the Corporation and Its Counsel, 10 THE REcoRD 266 (1955), Friedmann, Corporate
Power, Government By Private Groups, And The Law, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 155 (1957).
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within the area of their competence an authority so effective as to
justify labeling it a sovereign authority [italics supplied]. 16°
This pluralistic concept of sovereignty correctly attested to the
jphenomenon of the post-1870 period in the United States, wherein
-the national state tacitly and gradually but emphatically surrendered
-much of its power and authority to massive private groups, organized
runder the stimulation of the industrial age-giant corporations, labor
umnions, trade associations, et cetera. These establishments exercised
power over millions of people in our nation. The lives of their subjects
*were engineered in great detail by new economic and social forces that
function independently of institutionalized government. Exercising
power in this manner-huge concentrations-can only be characterized
as the performing of a public function by a private entity.
The second field of growing law . . . is the tendency to give
specific constitutional or legal protection to individuals in their
dealings with private units wielding great economic power ....
Protection of life, liberty and property contained in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, though speaking the old language of
possessory property and of individuals defending themselves against
arbitrary feudal government, does at least set up 'the implication
that corresponding protection exists where the individual derives
his economic life not from possessory property, but from position
in a modern industrial world.16
The new' approach to the concept of state action adopted the thesis
-of the pluralists as its fundamental premise. State action was then not
limited to the institutionalized organs of government but was coextensive
-with the activities of the government and of private individuals or
organizations exercising a public function (the reality of a concentration
of power over substantial numbers of people). It is the concentration of
power in private hands that marked out state action. Therefore, the
theory evolved is that performing a public function by a private entity
equals state action. Support for such a theory can be found in decision§
concerning corporate activities, labor unions, political clubs, and trans-
portation. The principal case relied upon by advocates of the public
160. Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term-Foreword: Political Theory and the
Nature of Liberty, 67 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1953).
161. Berle, Constitutional Limitation on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal
,Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 942 (1952).
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function theory of state action is Marsh v. Alabama,0 2 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1946. The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned and
operated a public town, consisting in the usual residential buildings and
business centers that one would expect to find in a small southern town
in the post-war period. The company maintained street and sewage
systems as well as the right to appoint police officers.
Gulf Shipbuilding posted rules prohibiting solicitation, absent per-
mission of the company. The concern regarded the entire town, its
streets, and sidewalks as its private property and therefore under its
exclusive control subject to leases and licenses granted to others. In
violation of these rules, a Jehovah Witness distributed religious literature.
When asked by the company police to cease her activities, she refused
to obey the request. She was arrested and convicted for violating an
Alabama statute making a penal offense to remain on the premises of
another after having been warned to leave.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision. The Court disregarded, as
irrelevant, arguments based on private property. The theory of the
company that it was excluding a trespasser was summarily rejected
with the following comment: "Ownership does not always mean ab-
solute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it." 13 Instead it reasoned that operations of the corporation in main-
taining a town amounted to state action and therefore the operations
had to be conducted within the limits of constitutionally protected
rights of individuals coming in contact with the town. The Court held
that a company town is a "public function" 104 and that a "public
function" could be performed by a private entity only on condition
that the individual rights guaranteed in the Constitution qualify all
actions by the corporation. The principle projected by the Court was
that performance of a public function by a private entity equals state
action.
Unfortunately, the Court did not expressly define "public function."
Nowhere did it make explicit reference in its opinion to the concentra-
tion of power in the corporation as the reason for restricting corporate
activities by the Bill of Rights. However, the distinguishing feature of
this case was the breadth and scope of the powers of the corporation
162. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
163. Id. at 506.
164. Id. at 509.
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to govern the daily lives of men. It was the potentiality of the corpora-
tion to use the company town as a means of threatening the essential
liberties of freedom of thought and communication that moved the
Court to recognize that the same constitutional inhibitions that would
have curtailed the power of a municipality operated as a restrictive
principle against a corporation occupying a similar position. It is sub-
mitted that the wide breadth of control over a substantial number of
lives is the heart of a public function in the case at bar.
In commenting on this decision, Berie has stated:
The denial by private employees of complainant's right to deliver
pamphlets on the streets of one mill town, dealt with in Marsh v.
Alabama, involved a mixture of corporate and "public" power.
The court argued that this denial of a constitutional right was
carried out by the corporation employee in substantial per-
formance of public functions. But what made them "public"
except that one corporation owned the entire town? The whim of
a single houseowner directed toward his tenants' religious practices
might be private.0 5
The concentration of power placed the public in this case at the mercy
of a corporate entity. Constitutionally created rights were being im-
pinged upon with no reasonable alternative accorded the individual in-
habitant to exercise his right to free communication of ideas. The con-
centration of corporate power over a substantial number of people
constitutes the potentiality of state action. Corporate power bearing
a substantial influence over the lives of a substantial number of people
equals state action.
The same kind of reasoning can be seen in affixing the concept of
pluralistic sovereignty to organized labor. In this instance, the control
was circumscribed in the sense that the concentration of power affected
a substantial number of people directly in only their economic well-
being. The idea that a union was not free to practice discrimination,
as a restriction flowing from the equal protection clause, was first ad-
vanced in Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry.,'0 6 decided by the Supreme
Court in 1944. The facts in this case were that a railroad brotherhood
discriminated against Negro workers in its negotiations as a bargaining
agent of railway workers. The Railway Labor Act l' 7 obliged the union
165. Berle, supra note 161 at 953.
166. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
167. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. (1954).
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to represent the Negroes. The Court ruled that the union acted con-
trary to the statute when it practiced racial segregation. However, the
Court's opinion clearly indicated that union could not practice racial
discrimination independent of the ban in the statute. The union was
barred from so acting by the equal protection clause because it was
clothed with powers similar to those exercised by an institutionalized
organ of government. It determined with the employer the scope of
the economic well-being of the workers.
If. . . the Railway Labor Act confers this power on a bargaining
representative of a craft or class of employees without any com-
mensurate statutory duty toward its members, constitutional ques-
tions arise. For the representative is clothed with power not
unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional
limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate
against the rights of those for whom it legislates and which is also
under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those
rights. " s8
The statement of the Court is a paraphrase of the theory of the pluralists.
The power of the union is substantial in the economic sphere. In that
sphere, therefore, it performs a public function just like a corporation
does in operating a company town. The Court in its dictum clearly
projected the idea of a public function-the reality of concentrated
economic power over a substantial number of people. The reasoning
of the case supports the proposition that performance of a public
function by a private entity equals state action.
This same notion was restated in American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds,'19 a 1950 decision by the Court. The National Labor Relations
Act 170 prescribed that union officers had to file with the N.L.RB.. non-
communist affidavits before they would be permitted to represent a
union before the board. The Court sustained the constitutionality of
the provision in language similar to the Steele dictum.
The loss of individual rights for the greater benefit of the. group
results in a tremendous increase in the power of the representative
of the group-the union. But power is never without responsi-
bility. And when authority derives in part from Government's
168. Steele, supra note 166 at 198.
169. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
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thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private persons
becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Govern-
ment itself. 17
When private organizations take over state functions, they become
part of the state. This has proven particularly true of the electoral
process. The leading case deciding what effect was produced by an as-
sumption of power by a private organization in the field of voting was
Smith v. A11wright,172 decided by the Supreme Court in 1944. The
issue confronting the Court was whether the Texas Democratic Party
through its state convention had the inherent power to determine its
membership in such a way as to exclude Negroes. The issue was strictly
one involving the status of a private organization that had taken over
a phase of the electoral process. It 'was a private organization. However
the Court found that Texas Democratic Party was functioning as a
state organ in the role it was playing. It was exercising control over
a substantial number of people. A public function was being performed.
Some 'have criticized this interpretation on the ground that the pri-
mary was a public function because the state had statutorily delegated to
the party the power to fix the qualifications for membership.
'The delegation of a duty by a state to a private organization is proper
provided it does not involve the abdication of legislative and judicial
powers. Such a delegation does not make the private organization an
institutionalized organ of government. It remains a private organization
which, however, is exercising a public function. Exercising that public
function marks it with the characteristic of state action.
The criticism discussed above was disposed of in Rice v. Ehnore, 73
decided in 1947 by a federal court of appeals. South Carolina repealed
all of its laws relating to party primaries.17 4 The Democratic Party
continued to operate a party primary but without state authorization to
conduct such operations. Of course, the purpose of this arrangement
was to exclude Negroes.
The Court found that the operation constituted state action. The
opinion stressed that the Democratic Party was not a private organiza-
tion in the sense of a country club. Because a political party was per-
forming a public function, it was executing state action regardless of
171. Communication Ass'n, supra note 169 at 401.
172. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
173. 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947).
174. Acts S.C., 44 Stat. at Large 2231 (1944).
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the fact that such functions were not delegated to it by the laws of the
state.
The theory of the Rice case was adopted by the Supreme Court in
1953 in Terry v. Adams1'5 The Texas Jaybird Party Association was
organized in Washington County, Texas. It excluded Negroes from
membership. The association held a "primary" in advance of the regular
Democratic Party primary. The winner of the Jaybird "primary" was
inevitably the successful candidate in the Democratic primary. The
Supreme Court held that the practice of racial discrimination under
these circumstances unconstitutional. The requisite state action was
founded on the fact that a voluntary association had assumed an effec-
tive role in the electoral processes. Justice Clark in a concurring opinion
declared:
.. . when a state structures its electoral apparatus in a form which
devolves upon a political organization the uncontested choice of
public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes
on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's
safeguards into play.'76
The voting cases illustrate that when a private organization assumes
the power to operate like an institution of the state government, it be-
comes impregnated with the character of the state. Its assumption of a
function performed by the state is state action regardless of whether
or not the state consented to such an operation. State action is affixed
to a private organization when it has amassed the power to perform
a state or public function.
It is submitted that organizations such as the Political Action Com-
mittee of the C.I.O. or the National Association of Manufacturers re-
semble the Jaybird Party. As the power of these groups to affect sub-
stantial results in our electoral processes continues to grow, the poten-
tiality of subjecting them to the restraints of the fourteenth amend-
ment should appreciably increase. They are certainly exercising a
public function by the control they assert over the processes of gov-
ernment, and the effect of that control on the electoral processes.
The reality of power in private hands over a substantial number of
people is established by the fact that a private organization can take
over a function traditionally performed by an institutionalized organ
175. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
176. Id. at 484.
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of the state. In the voting cases that power was the essence of a public
function just as it was in Marsh v. Alabama.177 These cases all assert a
common principle: performance of a public function by a private entity
equals state action. Since the applicability of the equal protection clause
exists wherever state action exists, freedom to be free from discrimina-
tion exists wherever a private organization commences a state or public
function.
Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co.17s decided in 1960, emphasizes the
point that when the state delegates to a private corporation the right to
use the public streets or public property it impresses that use with
the character of a public function. Publicly-owned property can
only be used incidentally for private benefit; it must be primarily
ordered to the benefit of the entire public. When a state function is
delegated to a private entity, the entity is performing a public and not
a purely private function. We have already commented on the sig-
nificance of this principle in our consideration of Smith v. A n'wright.
Two recent decisions have given fresh impetus to the principle that
performance of a public function by a private entity equals state action
-Evans v. Nezvton 79 and Mulkey v. Reitman.'80 The facts of both of
these decisions were dealt with in the preceding subsection treating
significant involvement of the state. In the former decision, the Court
held that the operation of a park willed to a municipality in trust for
white people only either by the city or by a successor trustee was viola-
tive of the equal protection clause. The majority opinion was premised
on the fact that operation of a park was primarily a function of the
state. The change of park control from municipal trustees to private
trustees was irrelevant to any questions regarding state action. A private
entity was performing a function that was characteristically a state func-
tion. The majority opinion answered the question of what was a state
function by appealing to tradition. Justice Douglas, speaking for the
majority declared:
A park, on the other hand, is more like a fire department or
police department that traditionally serves the community. Mass
recreation through the use of parks is plainly in the public domain,
Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526; and state courts that aid
private parties to perform that public function on a segregated
177. Marsh, supra note 162.
178. 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
179. Evans, supra note 142.
180. Mulkey, supra note 143.
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basis implicate the State in conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Like the streets of the company town in Marsh v.
Alabama, supra, the elective process of Terry v. Adams, supra,
and the transit system of Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, supra,
the predominant character and purpose of this park are munici-
pal.18 1
In his opinion Douglas equates the performance of a public function
by a private entity with state action. When the question of the definition
of a public function arises, Douglas, in the context of this case, states
that it arises when a private organization takes over a function tradition-
ally performed by an institutionalized organ of the state. When a
private entity does this, its authority is characteristically that of state
sovereignty. He does not make express reference to the role of con-
centration of power in private hands over a substantial number of people
in defining public function. He does not spell out the fact that the
reality of power in private hands over a substantial number of people
is established by the circumstance that a private organization can take
over a function traditionally performed by an institutionalized organ
of the. state. His failure in this regard is amended by his concurring
opinion one year later in Mulkey v. Reitmwan.182
In Mulkey v. Reitman a landlord was restrained from refusing to rent
an apartment to a Negro solely because of his race. Action was predi-
cated on a statutory right regarding open housing. The statute was
nullified by a state constitutional amendment. The Court held the
amendment violative of the equal protection clause.
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, ruled that state action existed
because the inability of the Negro to purchase housing on an open
market was due to the concentration of power of brokers, financing
interests, and builders, acting in unison to implement the principle that
a homogeneous neighborhood assures economic soundness. Douglas
quoted Madison in support of his position
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the
danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in
the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights
is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of the Government
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which
the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of
181. Evans, supra note 142 at 302.
182. Mulkey, supra note 143 at 1634-37.
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the Constituents. V. Writings of James Madison (Hunted. 1904),
p. 272.183
The concentration of power of the three interests mentioned above (a
small minority in American society) controls "where and how colored
people shall live and what the nature of our cities will be." 181 Inherent
in this power is state action. It exists there because of a private group
has exerted power to control the housing market of a substantial num-
ber of people. In doing this, it exercises a public function.
There has been no effort to present a chronological case development
of the public function theory. Without a doubt, the theory that a
private entity performing a public function equals state action has more
than two decades of constitutional decisions to support it. However, the
decisions are relatively few in number: all of the significant landmarks
in the adoption of this theory by the judiciary have been reported in
this article. Furthermore, the Court has not consistently applied it in
factual situations arising after Marsh and Terry where it would have
been 'relevant. Instead, the Court toyed with Shelley and Burton. If
Evans and Mulkey portend the future, and if the current wave of legal
periodical literature effectuates any positive results, it would be safe to
forecast increased adoption of the theory by the courts. With con-
tinued adoption, the equal protection clause will assume greater and
greater significance in curtailing the right to discriminate. Activities
regarded as purely private will be regarded as embodying state action
and thence will be subjected to scrutiny to determine precisely how
the right to be free from discrimination will be enforced by virtue of
the equal protection clause.
In its present state of embryonic development, the theory does not
stand without criticism. The principal criticism lies in the question of
how one determines when a private entity is performing a public
function.' 5 The decisions clearly indicate that a private entity performs
a public function when it assumes, with or without the consent of the
state, a function that is regarded as governmental in character. Decisions
in the area of municipal corporation law regarding the distinction be-
tween governmental and proprietary activities may be of some help to
the Court in deciding what a public function is. This area of activity will
183. Id. at 1637.
184. Id. at 1635.
185. For a statement of this objection, see, Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action
Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORu.L L. Q. 375, 404-07 (1958).
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continue to be an ever-broadening one as more state enterprises become
identified in the minds of people with the characteristic of a govern-
mental nature.
The decisions and the theorists also indicate that a private entity per-
forms a public function when it exercises a concentration of power over
a substantial number of people. Should the exercise of every kind of
power over a substantial number of people be included in the term state
action regardless of the interest affected by the power? Or should only
interests of a fundamental nature be affected? If the latter, how does
one distinguish fundamental from non-fundamental? Answers to these
questions have invited serious and challenging attacks to the public
function theory.
It is submitted that the character of the interest affected should be
innnaterial in applying the public function theory. The interest affected
may concern such vital matters as health or economic well being. It
may also concern non-vital matters such as entertainment. If any in-
terest of a substantial number of people is affected by the exercise of
power by a private individual or association, an adequate foundation
exists for predicating state action of the private entity.
What constitutes a substantial number of people? This is a question
that should best be answered on a case-by-case progression. It is a
question of degree. At one end of the spectrum, any national or sectional
interest is one affecting a substantial number of people. Any interest
involving people throughout an entire state will involve a substantial
number of people. An interest affecting a majority of people in a metro-
politan area involves a substantial number of people. At the other end
of the spectrum is the corner candy store owned and operated by a
sole proprietor serving a small number of children and some adults in a
typically well-populated urban area. That is an interest that does not
involve a substantial number of people. The clientele of an independent
portrait painter would hardly be substantial in number. The area be-
tween these poles is a gray one wherein the case system is the most
effective vehicle for determining the definition of a substantial number
of people.
State action would exist under the public function theory wherever
there is a substantial number of people controlled by a private entity.
This test may be objected to on grounds of practicality. How could
all of these entities of power be regulated so that equal protection of the
laws would be observed? The equal protection clause is self-executing.
Government enforcement of the right asserted therein does not have to
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be coextensive with the right guaranteed. A constitutional base for
action could exist without the government utilizing it to its maximum
capacity.
The public function test may prove to be the final answer to the prob-
lems generated by the necessity for the presence of state action for the
operability of the equal protection clause. It certainly is an improvement
over the principle that state action consists in either judicial enforcement
of a private discriminatory act or substantial involvement of the state in
private discrimination. 'With its adoption the nation will. move closer
to the concepts expressed by Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases. The
right to be free from discrimination will cease to be confined to actions
of institutionalized government. With the termination of that con-
finement, society will be confronted with developing a new mode of
reconciling the competing claims of the right of the private person to
be free to practice discrimination and his right to be free from discrimi-
nation. The broad coverage accorded to freedom from discrimination
will render the competition between the conflicting claims virgin
territory for the. courts to explore.
THE RIGHT OF DISCRIMINATION: THE SOCIAL BASIS FOR
ITS EXISTENCE
It is clear, from the preceding discussion, that there has been a con-
tinuing increase, in recent years, in the legal recognition of the right
to be free from discrimination. Concurrently, by the very nature of
the discriminatory process, there has been a diminution of the rights of
individuals to choose those with whom they wish to associate. But, as
was indicated at an earlier point in this article, a minimum of discrimi-
nation is desirable, and is even necessary to the effective functioning of
a democratic society. We have already pointed out that judicial prece-
dent supports the concept of the right of association. The right of
association is inherent in the nature of liberty itself. The right to dis-
criminate is an intrinsic component of the right of association.
Hence society and the judicial system are faced with the task of
resolving this dilemma: To what extent must the right to discriminate
be limited by the right to be free from discrimination? Can we make a
distinction between those spheres of activity and those circumstances
in which discrimination is universally regarded as rightful behavior and
those in which it is an infringement of the rights of other persons?
Should not rightful discrimination, the base for the right of association,
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enjoy the protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend--
ment?
We turn now to a consideration of the usages of the term "discrimina-
tion," in the hope that this will assist us in determining what kinds of
discrimination are usually considered by social scientists and inter-group-
relations workers to be an infringement of the rights of others. Our
ultimate goal is to determine when the right to discriminate should exist.
We resort to the works of social scientists, for legal precedents in this-
area are few in number. There was no reason. in the past for the exis-
tence of a more expanded jurisprudence concerning the right to dis-
criminate. History has been a record of judicial curtailment of the right
to be free from discrimination; and therefore few occasions have existed
to afford an opportunity for judicial exploration of the right to dis-
criminate.
In the succeeding discussion it will be necessary to do extensive inter-
polation. Most social scientists who have analyzed either discrimination
or prejudice write as though all discrimination is improper. In their-
analyses, however, the cases they consider tend to exemplify only certain
types of behavior; we have assumed that these are the types they include-
in their definition of discrimination. In a very real sense, then, we shall
be reinterpreting their analyses. Our rationale shall be that, while they
purport to be condemning discrimination per se, in reality they are
condemning only those types of behavior which are explicitly included
in their descriptions of the phenomenon. If these are the activities they
condemn, then presumably, those they fail to mention are not con--
demned. Those not condemned constitute rightful discrimination.
Rightful Discrimination Exists in the Primary Relations of Men
It is held by some social actionists that those spheres of life in which,
the individual customarily acts in his capacity as a private person, he
must enjoy the right to choose his associates, in short, to discriminate.
In public matters, however, such discrimination may be inappropriate
and wrongful. Thus Milton Gordon quotes a negro community leader:
. . . We stand very firmly on the distinction between public
situations and private relationships. As far as friends and associates
are concerned, this is a matter of private likes and dislikes. We
don't regard this as susceptible to the operations of law. .... 186
186. GoRDoN, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE 14 (1964).
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Attempts to apply this principle to concrete problems have led, how-
;ever, to considerable difficulty. No clear line between private and public
affairs is easily delineated. Shall the actions of a smigle individual always
-be considered "private" affairs? Are there any situations under which
they may be "public"? Suppose his actions place him considerably in
the public eye? Suppose his actions affect a large segment of the popu-
late? May we still call him "private" actions? Can the actions of a
group ever be a private affair? Or are they always public? One would
hardly consider a family's actions public, although a family is technically
a group. What about a larger group, such as a voluntary club? If men
are to be free to associate, as is the basis for our pluralistic society,
they must be free to form voluntary associations as they choose, i.e. to
discriminate. A clear distinction between private and public acts of
,discrimination must distinguish between situations such as these, in
order to identify those spheres of life in which the individual customarily
acts in his capacity as a private person. We reiterate that social actionists
assert that in these spheres the individual must enjoy the right to dis-
criminate.
It is proposed that the sociological distinction between "primary"
and "secondary" relationship may assist in formulating this distinction.
It is submitted that primary relationships should never be inhibited by
law with regard to the role that discrimination plays in their formation.
Such relationships should enjoy the protection of the rights of associa-
tion and the embryonic right of privacy both rights constituting
manifestations of liberty. A "primary relationship," according to Charles
H. Cooley who originated the concept, was one which was characterized
by intimate association. . . fusion of individualities in a common whole.
...,, 11 Primary interactions between people are, therefore, basically
relationships between friends. They are highly personal; the emotions, in
fact, the entire personalities of the participants are involved. It is this
type of relationship which one may have with his spouse, his closest
friends, his parents, and perhaps his siblings.
As the polar opposite of this type of relationship, sociologists have
conceived of the "secondary relationship," which is characterized by
impersonal, highly formalized relations between people. The relations
which occur between buyer and seller, borrower and lender, consumer
187. COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 23 (1909). Cooley also included the notion of a
"face-to-face" relationship, which has since been seen to be ineffective in distinguishing
between primary and secondary relationships-see, Faris, The Primary Group: Essence
and Accident, 38 AM. J. SocioLoGy, 41, 41-50 (1932).
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and manufacturer, and so on, tend to be secondary in nature in a modern
industrialized society, except, of course, in the situation in which buyer
and seller or borrower and lender happen also to be friends. Secondary
relationships differ from primary relationships in that it is not essential
for the adequate maintenance of the former that the participants enjoy
primary feelings toward each other, or develop emotional attachments.
It is suggested that the individual should be free to admit to his
friendship, or primary relations, anyone he chooses, and consequently,
to discriminate against those whom he chooses, for whatever reason, not
to have as his friends. Thus if a man chooses not to develop close friend-
ships across racial lines, it is our contention that the state can in no way
force him to do so. Parenthetically we might add, however, that should
he choose to develop primary ties across racial lines, the state can in
no way force him to abstain from doing so. Such close relationships
are the basis for the associations which intervene between the individual
and his government, which prevent society from dissolving into a mass
of alienated individuals, and which, therefore, make it possible for a
democratic society to operate. The alternative to the operation of such
right is a totalitarian mass.
Where the nature of the relationship does not involve close personal
attachments, it becomes possible for society to demand that the in-
dividual eliminate from consideration any factors, such as race, creed,
color, sex, et cetera, which have no immediate bearing upon the re-
lationship. Thus a man may be forced to accept a Negro or a Jew as
the buyer of his home, since race or creed are irrelevant to determining
whether a man will be able to pay the price demanded for the specific
commodity. His next-door neighbor may also be required to accept a
Negro or Jew as a resident of his street, since intimate emotional re-
lations are not necessary for the maintenance of peaceful neighborhood
relations; he need not, however, strike up a close friendship with the new
neighbor, nor can society impose such an obligation on him.
It is clear, however, that primary and secondary relationships are not
always mutually exclusive. A secondary relationship which persists for
some time may develop into a close friendship or kinship relationship
may lead to other matters, such as a business parnership, which are
essentially secondary in nature. Hence the employer-employee and
buyer-seller relationships, for example, are basically secondary matters.
But at times they may involve a primary association as well, such as the
case in which the grocery store owner hires his son or a close friend to
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work in his store, or a man sells his car or a piece of land to a close
friend.
In such situations the distinction becomes clouded. When can we say
the relationship is essentially primary, and that discrimination is, there-
fore, permissible? And when is it essentially secondary, allowing, there-
fore, of limitations on the right of discrimination? A man should not
be prohibited from selling property to his friend, nor from giving a
preference to his son or his friend in his hiring practices. On the other
hand, he may be prohibited from withholding proffered employment
or goods from someone if that person's race or creed or nationality is
somehow distasteful to him. In short, if the individual wishes to base a
subsequent secondary relationship upon a prior, primary one, he has to
be permitted to do so. If, on the other hand, he makes it known to
the public that he is willing to establish a secondary, impersonal relation-
ship of some kind, he must be prepared to establish such a relationship
with whoever desires to take up his offer and can satisfactorily perform
the consideration for it. He may, therefore, be prohibited by law from
practicing discrimination in his choice of persons to whom the service
will be rendered.
We believe that the key to establishing a workable distinction be-
tween a primary and a secondary relationship in the context of the situ-
ations described in the last paragraph lies in whether the offer to estab-
lish a relationship is or is not made public. Thus if a man wishes to sell a
commodity at a reduced rate to his family or close friends, and no
one else, he should have the right to do so, although this involves the
practice of discrimination. If he chooses, however, to hold out an offer
to the public at large of such commodity as he has to sell, then he must
be prepared to sell to whoever can meet his price, whether they be of a
skin color or religious belief which suits his taste or not, provided
society and the law so demand. Similarly, if a man holds out to the
public an offer of employment, through some public medium, such as a
newspaper advertisement, a handbill, or a publicly placed notice-even
a sign in the window of his store-he may be considered to have made
a public offer and may be forced not to discriminate between appli-
cants except for good and sufficient reason.
Even if the commodity offered is not a necessity of life this rule may
apply. For example, a private club may certainly reserve its facilities
for members only, and should not be prohibited from discriminating
against non-members in the use of such facilities, nor from extending
membership in what is essentially a circle of primary associates to whom-
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ever they choose. If, on the other hand, one considers the case of
the so-called "private club" which functions as a subterfuge for prac-
ticing discrimination in secondary relations with impunity, we have a
totally different case. In such a case the club is holding out to the
public an offer of its facilities, or perhaps even an offer of membership
in the club. Once such offer is made public, the club has set forth its
willingness to establish secondary relationships. Its freedom to discrimi-
nate may, therefore, be curtailed.
We have suggested, therefore, that in the sphere of primary relation-
ships, discrimination, on whatever basis the discriminator wishes, con-
stitutes rightful behavior or activity. Such a relationship should enjoy
the protection inherent in the principles of freedom of association and
privacy. We have already discussed the constitutional basis of the right
of association. A word about the right of privacy is in order.
The right of privacy, insofar as protection from intrusion of state
action is concerned, is premised on the due process clause. Its ultimate
foundation consists in a host of rights specified in the first ten amend-
ments to Constitution. The Court, in describing this right, has referred
to it as a penumbra of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.188 The right
of privacy protects a man in his beliefs, thoughts, emotions, and sen-
sations. It is the right to be let alone. The precise dimensions of the right
have not been defined. It is in its embryonic state. That it includes ac-
tivities within "primary relation" groups cannot be doubted. 8 '
Reasonable and Individually Based Discrimination Is Rightful in
Secondary Relationships
We are not suggesting that discrimination in secondary matters is
never appropriate. A careful analysis of the usage of the term "discrimi-
nation" by persons concerned with the problem points out those secon-
dary relations in which such discrimination is rightful and therefore en-
tided to the protection of the due process clause of the Constitution. One
characteristic generally attributed to wrongful discrimination is its ten-
dency to be based upon the ethnic, religious, or physical characteristics,
including chiefly race and sex, of the persons against whom it is directed.
In the social science literature, both the term prejudice and the term
discrimination have been used almost solely in this sense.
Gordon W. Allport, for example, in a work on the topic, states his
188. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
189. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 212; Griswold,
The Right To Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. R~v. 216 (1960).
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aim as "to clarify one underlying issue [of the science of human re-
lations]-the nature of human prejudice." "90 He then proceeds to de-
scribe "prejudice and persecution" as being based on ethnic, religious,
and, more recently, racial grounds. 9' Similarly, Bruno Bettelheim and
Morris Janowitz, in their "Preface" to Dynamics of Prejudice state that
it is prejudice and intolerance based on etbnic grounds with which
they are concerned. 9 2 At a later point they specify their own concern
as being with anti-semitic and anti-Negro attitudes.'93 Again, the re-
ligious, cultural, or racial characteristics of an individual are singled out
as the basis for the discriminatory behavior which is decried.
Analysts of discrimination have also noted, however, that such dis-
crimination and prejudice are directed toward ethnic, religious, or
racial groups as groups. That is, the possibility of there being individual
differences within the group are ignored. Hence each person belonging
to the victimized group is judged solely on the basis of the assumed
characteristics of the group, not on his own merits as an individual.
Hence, Gerhart Saenger points out: "There is the tendency to evaluate
the person not as an individual but as a member of his group, as well
as the belief in the inferiority of all its members." 194 Most theorists do
not seem to object to individually-based discrimination, that is, to a
preference for the company of one man over another because the latter's
behavior or personality are in some way distasteful. Thus, Allport
reports an incident in which a man with a Jewish-sounding name was
refused hotel accommodations, while one with an Anglo-Saxon sounding
name was welcomed. He then comments:
None of the hotels knew "Mr. Lockwood" or "Mr. Greenberg."
For all they knew "Mr. Greenberg" might be a quiet, orderly
gentleman, and "Mr. Lockwood" rowdy and drunk. The decision
was obviously made not on the merits of the individual, but on
"Mr. Greenberg's" supposed membership in a group. 95
There is a clear implication that, if the decision had been made on the
individual's merits as an individual, the discrimination would have been
fitting and proper.
190. Alport, Preface to ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE at xv (3d ed. 1954).
191. Id. at xv-xvi.
192. Bettelhiem & Janowitz, Preface to Dynamics of Prejudice in BzrrELmE &
JANowITz, SoCIAL CHANGE ANDm Rjummc at 101 (1964).
193. Id. at 106.
194. SAENGER, Tim SociAL PSYCHoLOGY OF PREJumCE 3 (1953).
195. AimPOR, supra note 190 at 5.
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Hence, a major characteristic of that discrimination which most op-
ponents of discrimination have clearly decried is its tendency to focus
on characteristics which an individual shares with the abhorred group,
and a consequent failure to consider his characteristics as an individual.
We conclude, therefore, that discrimination is wrongful when it is
directed towards members of an ethnic, religious, or physically distin-
guishable group as a group, without regard for their qualities as in-
dividuals. Secondly, a characteristic of that prejudice and discrimination
which is abhorrent is its irrational or non-rational base. That is, there is
no observable reason for the discrimination which can be discerned by
the objective viewer. Hence, Allport describes prejudice as an "un-
warranted" prejudgment or one which "lacks basis in fact." 10' Of course
it is recognized that:
A prejudiced person will almost certainly claim that he has suffi-
cient warrant for his views . .. But, in most cases, it is evident
that his facts are scanty and strained. He resorts to a selective
sorting of his own few memories, mixes them up with hearsay,
and overgeneralizes." 197
And further, that "... few if any human judgments are based on ab-
solute certainty. . . The sufficient warrant for any judgment is always
a matter of probabilities." 108 But it is recognized here that some judg-
ments of other persons or groups may be based on "sufficient warrant,"
and discrimination based upon such judgments would, presumably, be
likewise varranted.
Allport notes, for example, the case of an anthropologist who was
accused of prejudice and discrimination because he refused to permit his
children to associate with members of the Indian tribe he was studying.
Allport argues that he was not displaying race prejudice but merely
taking well-warranted precautions in shielding his children from tuber-
culosis, which was widely prevalent in the village."" In such a case,
Allport argues, the anthropologist acted rightfully in discriminating
against the Indians as companions for his children. It might even be
argued that, at times, group-based discrimination may be legitimate:
in the case just cited, the discrimination is obviously against a group,
196. ld. at 7.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 8.
199. Id. at 4.
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the entire Indian tribe. The discrimination is considered to be rightful,
however, because of its reasonableness.
As the preceeding analysis has shown, wrongful discrimination tends
to exhibit three characteristics: First, it is in the sphere of social inter-
action which we have called "secondary relationships"; for we have
noted that certain spheres of life, namely, personal friendships, or pri-
mary relationships, are outside the domain of public direction. Hence
only discrimination in the less intimate relationships of human inter-
action could be considered to be inequitable or unjust to the recipient of
the discrimination. Second, it is usually directed against persons because
of their ethnic, religious, or racial backgrounds, but always it is directed
against these groups as groups, that is, the possibility of individual varia-
tion is not considered. And third, it is discrimination on the basis of
judgments made for insufficient reasons; that is, the discrimination is
unwarranted by the facts of the case.
If irrational and group-based discrimination be the only discrimination
in secondary relations castigated by social actionists as wrongful, can it
not be argued that discrimination which fails to meet these criteria is
right and proper? In fact, can it not be further argued that it is an un-
just violation of the rights of the individual to prevent him from so
discriminating? For example, does not a man have a right to shield him-
self from contact with those who might infect him with disease? Does
not an employer have a right to refuse to employ a job applicant who
is personally objectionable to him? The objection of this employer is
directed only to the individual's personality. We suggest that discrimi-
nation is rightfully practiced when the above characteristics of wrong-
ful discrimination are absent. Rightful discrimination in secondary re-
lations should enjoy the protection of the right of association.
We add a final note in regard to discrimination in secondary rela-
tions. It is important, also, to point out that discrimination practiced by
secondary groups which are specifically organized for the betterment
of an ethnic, religious or racial group may also be considered as rightful
discrimination. As Benjamin R. Epstein and Arnold Forster note:
It should be apparent. . that those groups which are organized
for clearly religious purposes have an unchallengeable right to
impose religious requirements for membership. There can be no
question of the right of a Newman Club to limit membership to
Catholics, the men's club of a temple to a Jew. .... 20
200. EPSTEIN & FORSTER, "SoME OF N1 BEsr FRIENDS . . . ." 21 (2d ed. 1962.)
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By extension we may presume that groups organized primarily for
ethnic purposes, such as the assistance or betterment of persons of a
particular ethnic or racial group, might reasonably restrict their mem-
bership to persons of that ethnic or racial background. Hence the
Polish Benevolent Society, or the Japanese-American Citizens League,
or the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
might, if they choose, restrict membership to Poles or to Japanese or
to non-whites, respectively. One would have to grant, furthermore,
that a majority group, the white population for example, would have
the same right, namely, to found associations for the advancement of
their own interests. The existence of such groups is especially impor-
tant to the existence and prospering of a democratic society; for it is
precisely such associations which are most likely to intervene between
the individual and the society in the beneficial manner discussed by
Tocqueville, Mills, and Kornhauser.
CONCLUSION
The right to discriminate exists as surely as the right to be free from
discrimination. Its constitutional premise is the right to "liberty" de-
clared in the fourteenth amendment. A complimentary principle is the
right to be free from discrimination. The latter right flows from the
principle "of equal protection of the laws."
No need has existed before the present to assert the reality of the
right to discriminate. The intent of the framers of the equal protec-
tion clause to secure to all freedom from discrimination in the enjoy-
ment of their fundamental rights was ignored for almost a century and
a half by society and the judiciary. In fact the clause was used for
over a half century to foster segregation.
History is on the threshold of doing an about face. For the past two
decades the right to be free from discrimination has been continuously
advanced in the courts of our land. It is safe to predict that this right
will continue to enjoy additional support, recognition, and expansion
from both society and the American judicial system. As it does, it will
be inevitable that the courts will be called upon to define its outer limits.
Such a definition will have to be undertaken with due regard to the
scope of the right to discriminate. A reconciliation of these two basic
but conflicting rights has to take place.
It is submitted that such a reconciliation should be based on the
following principles. The protections afforded by the fourteenth amend-
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ment are not limited to institutionalized state action. They are co-
extensive with the presence of sovereign power whether manifested in
a formal branch of government or in private entitiesperforming a public
function. A public function is being executed by a private entity wher-
ever it assumes a responsibility or right that society has come to regard as
governmental in character or wherever it wields power over substantial
number of people. Segregation must be regarded as synonymous with
discrimination regardless of whether or not equal benefits are accorded to
all groups affected by the classification. The right to discriminate is unin-
hibited by the equal protection clause in all of the primary group re-
lations of man. In this sense the right to discriminate is supported by
the concept of the right to privacy. Furthermore, it should be recog-
nized as existing in the secondary group relations of man wherever dis-
crimination is not wrongful. Discrimination is wrongful in these re-
lations when the following factors are present: 1) it is directed against
persons because of their ethnic, religious, or racial backgrounds but
always against these persons as members of a group; and 2) it is based
on a judgment wholly irrational in character. This summary of prin-
ciples is not intended to be exclusive. It is offered with the hope that
it may help in developing a workable pattern of relationships between
the right to be free from discrimination and the right to discriminate.
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